ARAVOT
DAILY’S
INTERVIEW
WITH JIRAIR LIBARIDIANQUESTION: The 90th Anniversary of the Genocide was
marked by a number of activities in Armenia and in the Diaspora. You participated
or observed many of them. Do you have any thoughts about these activities?ANSWER:
This certainly was a special year. I think we can talk about it more openly now
that the main activities are over.It is heartening of course to see our
people and our young generations continuing to respect the memory of the victims
of the Genocide in an increasingly organized and unified way.I do have
questions in my mind, nonetheless, regarding some aspects of this process. The
silent march to Tzitzerkaberd, the main event in my view, has been one of the
most solemn, dignified and moving experiences any person could live through since
the monument was erected in 1967. It is a collective spiritual experience, a form
of communion with the victims. Some of that solemnity and dignity was lost this
year, it seems to me; with banners and slogans, at times it seemed as if it was
a political demonstration. I think there are more appropriate places for that.
The show of respect for the memory of the victims, which is the purpose of the
march, and the contemplative nature of the monument require a more serene presence.I
am not sure also that billboards marking the anniversary in the main streets of
Yerevan were appropriate. Billboards advertise or sell things. Do we need to advertise
or sell the Genocide?More generally, we have to think of the direction
in which we in Armenia and the Diaspora are going as far as our relations with
the international community are concerned. Is the Genocide our only concern in
our relations with our neighbors, with other countries? If that is the case, then
why not demand that countries like Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia
recognize first their responsibility in creating the conditions for a genocide
before they recognize that of the Ottoman Empire? Furthermore, is a country
"pro-Armenian" if it recognizes the Genocide? The current atmosphere
lends to that view. What if France, for example, recognized the Genocide but pressured
Armenia to make concessions on Karabakh that Armenia cannot make on its own? What
will we tell France? That it is not pro-Armenian? Is it possible that this single
issue may blind us to what else is going with regard to a number of others we
have to settle with the international community. There is also the danger
that the Genocide issue may be used by other powers-just as the "Armenian
Question" was historically-to settle their own accounts with Turkey, accounts
that have little to do with the Genocide, thus reducing the memory of our victims
to an element in their games, an element that would be used and abused, picked
up and dropped at their will, not ours? Doesn’t that make us vulnerable to dangerous
manipulations? Doesn’t that mean turning over the key to our policy making -to
our sense of success and failure, in fact our agenda-to others who have no compunction
manipulating us?At the end, the question is: Is the "victim"
psychology and the political program that ensues from it the way we as a state
and as Diaspora want to relate to the world? However righteous and even comfortable
that may make us feel, we must at least ask the question. The world may
or may not owe us something. But it certainly will not give us everything we want.
Historically, it has given little. QUESTION: Is there an alternative strategy?ANSWER:
I think we have come a long way since independence in Turkish-Armenian relations.
Changes in Turkey on the societal level and even failed attempts at establishing
dialog have contributed to an atmosphere within which increased dialog with Turkish
citizens may be equally, if not more productive. We have to recognize that ultimately
it is the people of Turkey we have to address on this issue. It is their historians
and scientists, their teachers and journalists, and their young generations who
we must help to come to terms with their history. In the long run, it is the more
effective way. It is not the easiest task. But if we are serious, it is the people
of Turkey that must understand and assess their history. That would be true recognition.
That requires an understanding on our part as to why it is that not only successive
governments of Turkey that have denied the Genocide, but also Turkish society
by and large. That requires recognizing changes in Turkish society that have been
opening opportunities for us in the last two decades or so. That requires recognition
of the value of the policies of independent Armenia’s first administration that
did not define Turkey as an enemy and created an environment for a critical view
of Turkish history and political structures from within. That requires recognition
of the efforts of a number of Armenian scholars who have been in a dialog with
their Turkish scholars for a number of years now. But I am not sure this is convenient
to many on our side. I am certain that we have much to gain by framing the issue
of Genocide recognition as a problem for Turkish society and democracy and little
to gain by making it a European or Western issue.The most recent events
in Turkey testify to the validity of such a strategy. Over thirty scholars supported
by three universities, one of them a state university, took it upon themselves
to organize a conference on the Armenian Question. Some in the government intervened
and made it difficult for the scholars to meet. Nonetheless, we must recognize
that we have entered a new phase in our relations with Turkey since independence
and that new phase has also coincided with changes in Turkey. We must adjust our
direction.QUESTION: The 90th Anniversary activities included an International
Conference in Yerevan in which you participated. Any comments on the Conference?ANSWER:
Yes, I participated in the deliberations on the second day, since I had to attend
a workshop on Security and Democracy in Tzaghkadzor the first day, a workshop
that had been decided upon before I received the invitation. I was asked to chair
the last session, on the Turkish-Armenian relations.From what I could observe
that day, the conference had a large number of high quality, international participation
with many dignified presentations, particularly touching upon the international
dimensions and the legal aspects of the question of Genocide. A number of questions
were raised and hopefully will become subject to public debate. The conference
did have some problem areas. The participants included high level international
figures with their concerns, as well as academic, public and political figures
with theirs. Combined with a very large audience, it was impossible to pursue
lines of thought and sustain debate in a manner that satisfied the participants
or the audience. Nonetheless, it was commendable that the issues were framed beyond
the confines of the Armenian case. The participation of international figure such
as former President Lech Walesa of Poland and Juan Mendez, Special Advisor to
the UN Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, and of internationally
recognized scholars, especially legal experts, gave much weight to the Conference.
QUESTION: There were a number of issues raised during the session you chaired
which were not properly explored. Professor Richard Hovannisian, for example prefaced
his presentation with a statement that recent events vindicated the position of
Armenia’s first Foreign Minister– his son Raffi Hovannisian–with regard to Turkey.
Professor Rouben Safrastyan argued that the policies of President Ter-Petrossian
were misconceived since Turkey’s policy toward Armenia being of a "coercive"
nature. Do you agree?ANSWER: First, I find Professor Hovanisian’s personalized
comments inappropriate for an international conference on the Genocide, as I made
clear at the end of the session. Raffi is a person with many qualities, continues
to contribute to Armenia’s political life and he will continue to do so. He is
not the issue in question. On a technical level, with regard to Raffi’s
tenure as Foreign Minister, it is clear that if a Minister disagrees with a President,
who is the elected official constitutionally responsible for foreign policy and
has the right to define policy, then for a minister to conduct policy contrary
to that defined by the president is unacceptable in any government. I ascribe
that incident to youthful enthusiasm.As for Professor Safrastyan, it is
not clear to me when he started thinking in the direction he stated. Rouben was
part of my analysis group; he was the senior expert on Turkey. He fully participated
in the discussions we had, contributed to policy making and even accompanied me
twice I believe when I went to Ankara for negotiations. I do not remember him
having any reservations or raising any objections regarding the policy that was
decided and conducted. If he had any objections he could have raised them then
and may be we would have benefited from his expertise. It is possible, of course,
to revise one’s views; but in that case it would have been better for him to acknowledge
his role in the policies he is now criticizing. If a person is in a position where
he can make a difference and does not do so, one would have to question his behavior.
I have difficulty evaluating his later criticism and question his reasons for
his earlier silence or his criticism today.More importantly, the assessment
of the first administration’s policies toward Turkey-by Professors Hovannisian
and Safrastyan or by others-requires a more serious and responsible analysis than
was offered by any of the participants. Armenia’s policy then and in its
essentials now is based on the principle that the ultimate security and prosperity
of a country, especially one with Armenia’s characteristics, depends on normal
relations with all of its neighbors. I think that the history of this republic
proves that. Neighbors provide the most likely threats or the most likely opportunities.
The purpose of foreign policy is to minimize the first and reach out to the second.
All else ensues from this principle, all else is a matter of tactics.Simple
principles guiding foreign policy have practical consequences. One does not only
have enemies but also makes them. This implies that we must take responsibility
for our actions and inactions, for our words and for our silences. For our policies.
If our policies don’t make a difference because Turkey will be an enemy eternally
or because the only fact that counts is that its predecessor state, the Ottoman
Empire, committed genocide, then we should not think about policy, then freedom
to think and to elect and independence become irrelevant. That is an escape from
responsibility. What would that have meant for an Armenia whose economy had collapsed
with the USSR, an Armenia in an energy crisis, under a full blockade from Azerbaijan
and involved in the Karabakh war? Now let us assume for a moment that we
had based our policy on a completely different principle. Let us assume that we
had brought Genocide recognition to the forefront of our policy and treated Turkey
as the eternal enemy because it had not recognized the Genocide; and that we poured
all our energies into that battle. What would have been the result?It is
true that we were unable to achieve our ultimate goal, relations were not normalized
as a result of our policy. Under the circumstances, it was not to be easy. Yet,
we must also take responsibility for that; it is not all Turkey’s fault. Our occupation
of Azerbaijani territory, especially beginning with Kelbajar was the major factor
in that failure. Whatever our reasons for doing so, the fact remains that we took
such action which was seen as deeply suspicious and reprehensible from Turkey’s
point of view. And should our policy be assessed only by the standard of full
success, i.e., the establishment of normal relations? Isn’t it important that
under the circumstances Turkey showed much restraint during the war when its ethnic
cousins were losing the war with dire consequences for hundreds of thousands of
their citizens? Perhaps more important is the example of the wheat supply
situation in Armenian in the fall of 1992, when the Abkhaz war interrupted the
only open rail link that brought wheat to Armenia. At that time Armenia produced
only 40% of the wheat it consumed annually; and even that was endangered because
of the economic disruptions. Turkey could have refused our request to open the
Kars-Gyumri rail line to bring in the 100,000 tons of wheat the European Union
had pledged to Armenia. Turkey did not refuse our request and the border was opened
for that purpose. It became possible to pass the horrible 1992-1993 winter without
famine in Armenia. Would that have been possible if our policy had been different?
Is famine what the victims of the Genocide would have wanted us to condemn our
people to with the possible loss of Karabakh as a consequence?The unfortunate
fact is that such views are being expressed by historians who should know the
history of the First Republic and who should be able to situate policies and actions
in the context of history and not in the abstract world of wishful thinking.No,
I do not agree with my colleagues. As deeply as the issue of Genocide recognition
touches us all deeply and angers us, the existence of the state of Armenia and
the survival, security and prosperity of the living-especially those living in
that state and Karabakh– remain the highest value. I don’t think the victims
of the Genocide would have wanted it differently. New martyrdom is not the only
or even best way to respect the memory of those who perished.QUESTION:
One other issue came up during that last session which you chaired. The secretary
of the HH Dashnaktsutyune, Kiro Manoyan, thought this conference was an improvement
over the one you had organized ten years ago on the 80th Anniversary, since his
party was absent then and was represented now.ANSWER: That was more amusing
than serious, I thought, since his comment raised more questions than it answered.
Ten years ago, when we had initiated the idea of an international conference on
the 80th Anniversary and organized it, there were no parties represented in the
conference, since we did not see the Genocide as a party issue. On the other hand,
no party other than his was invited to this one. I do not have an answer to this
one.
