Exactly ten years ago, the body of the last but one General Secretary of the USSR CPSU Central Committee Konstantin Chernenko was consigned to the earth (or better to say, to the Kremlin wall). The problem of the leader of the huge country, as it is known, was decided within narrow circle of decrepit persons called Political Bureau. And decrepit persons decided that the power should be given to the youngest among them, 54 years old Mikhail Gorbachev. A new era, the last era, was created in the history of the Soviet state.
Gorbachev, certainly, differed from his predecessors with higher intellectual level and relatively progressive views. But to link what happened in the last ten years with his personal characteristics, good or bad will, probably, would be an exaggeration. Such a great country, like the Soviet Union, totalitarian regime with strong leverages, ideology of communist equalization achieving sub-consciousness of people would not collapse and disappear in the result of one, at least genius person’s activities (it would be correct to say that destruction of all of this was initiated in 1985 and has not yet come to an end to this day, and the slowest changes, as it was expected, are taking place in our psychology).
The displays of crisis of the Soviet Union were visible before Gorbachev, in early 70s, and the crisis first of all was economic. Collective farms and state farms in the villages, and “national property” in the cities finally proved their inefficiency The existence of an endless country, where the goods (and natural) were created in some regions or countries, but were equally distributed throughout the country, was not beneficial first to Russia. Should the system be operative and perfect, it could not be destroyed neither by Gorbachev, nor by masons, nor by Central Intelligence Service, nor even by Khachik Stamboltsyan. There was a simple, materialistic interests in the collapse of USSR and creation of the new economic system that was coming from influential circles of Moscow, Russia, and it was realized not by the political leaders, Gorbachev, but Andropov. The first draft of “perestroika” was created directly by his instructions. Of course, the communist leaders could not predict that their indecisive half-steps towards the reform will lead to strong shocks. But they instinctively were feeling that more terrible explosion is expected during artificial and forced maintenance of the system. And during the first 3 years of Gorbachev tenure, quite a lot was done, to the possible extent, to make a smooth transition. But since 1988, such policy exhausted itself. There was probably a significant defect in the estimations of Andropov, Gorbachev, their staffs and expert, they were not considering the national factor, any nation of dignity, even in case of the smallest possibility, will strive to create its own state. And the reforming measures organized from above clashed against national-democratic movements spontaneously emerging from the bottom.
This movement in Armenia was strong and remains powerful in his nationwide character. No matter how often the calls sound for becoming a province of other countries or restoring the Soviet Union, they will not find a wide variety of response. As they say, bargaining is needless here.
Aram ABRAHAMYAN
14.03.1995
