By Kakha Gogolashvili
The political association model offered to Georgia covers two directions of cooperation between the parties which are different from the formal point of view; namely, the process of the establishment of democratic political institutions and cooperation in the fields of foreign policy, security and defense. In reality, the European Union (EU) has never made a strong distinction between supporting democratic development (internally and region-wide), stability and security. Any framework agreement signed with third countries reflects this attitude which is not an accident but an expression of the EU’s fundamental mission. The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) establishes the EU’s external action on its guiding principles “which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.” According to the Treaty, the Union will seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries and international, regional or global organisations which “share the principles” referred to above. The TEU promotes a high degree of cooperation in international relations with third states aimed at safeguarding values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity. The EU’s foreign policy pursues per se to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law and, at the same time, preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security. In all of these, the EU, acts in accordance with existing international conventions, charters and duly acknowledged obligations. At this point, we will not refer to other objectives of international cooperation laid down in the founding treaties but resume with the affirmation that two distinct directions of international action, from which we started our reasoning, are strongly interrelated in the logic and spirit of European integration.
From the EU’s founding treaties, it becomes obvious why external cooperation agreements with third countries (or international organisations) always contain provisions on the establishment of a political dialogue aimed at respect and the promotion of democratic values, peace and security. In this it makes no difference what kind of cooperation agreement you verify such as, for the example, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA, signed with former Soviet republics), Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA, for the Western Balkans) or the Europe Agreement. Even the agreements signed with Chile and Mexico; respectively, in 2000 and 2002, contain same provisions laying down the foundations for political dialogue based upon the same principles.
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Let us find if there is still any difference among the above mentioned forms of agreements in terms of the depth of political cooperation and the obligations taken by the parties. The title of the agreement can sometimes be misleading. The term “association agreement,” used for different international accords concluded by the EU, may not equally mark the level of rapprochement in all areas. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (1995) sets free trade areas among partners that match them in this with Stabilisation and Association Agreements or Europe Agreements. Indeed, the political dialogue according to this agreement seems less ambitious than even under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements concluded nearly at the same time with countries that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Important to note that c In order to judge the rate of the cooperation ambition for the different agreements, we have compared the wording concerning the obligation of converging the positions on international issues. We can start from the TEU that defines the task of coordination in external policies among member states as follows: “Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an over-increasing degree of convergence of Member States’ action.” Cooperation in areas of CFSP between EU member states intends to reach an over-increasing degree of convergence and a mutual political solidarity. This in general terms does not match the level of the ambition which the European Union demonstrates in other areas; trade and economic cooperation, first of all, where the TEU establishes an exclusive competence and is ruled from supranational heights. Therefore, no one should expect an extension of similar provisions to an international agreement at a higher or even a similar degree.
Three different types of association agreements signed with Morocco, Chile and Serbia can serve as good examples for observing the differentiation among the aforementioned formats. The agreement with Morocco calls to: “…facilitate rapprochement between the Parties through the development of better mutual understanding and regular coordination on international issues of common interest; enable each Party to consider the position and interests of the other; contribute to consolidating security and stability in the Mediterranean region and in the Maghreb in particular.” With Chile, the agreement states that: “…Parties shall, as far as possible, coordinate their positions and undertake joint initiatives in the appropriate international for, and cooperate in the field of foreign and security policy… to cooperate in the fight against terrorism in accordance with international conventions and with their respective laws and regulations.” From these two agreements, we observe a more or less equal level of commitments covering cooperation in security issues. The cooperation, however, pursues relatively narrow objectives; namely, a) cooperation in regional matters (Morocco) and b) the fight against terrorism (Chile). There is no mentioning of the convergence of positions but parties “enabling to consider” (Morocco) or, “as far as possible, coordination of the positions”. Obviously, a deeper cooperation approach is offered to Serbia calling for: “…common views on security and stability in Europe, including cooperation in the areas covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union.” First of all, the aforementioned “common views” resembles a notion of the “common position” referred to in Article 25 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Without doubt, this agreement provides for a much wider space in security cooperation matters than the previous two. The same provisions from the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Georgia (in force since 1999) provide for: “…increasing convergence of positions on international issues of mutual concern thus increasing security and stability in the region… strengthening of stability and security in Europe.” It is obvious that even the PCA, far from the abovementioned AAs in terms of trade liberalisation (simply providing MFN) show an equal and, in some cases, less (Serbia) but also, sometimes, higher degree of political rapprochement as concerns cooperation in security matters. It is logical that Georgia was offered to join the EU’s “common position” statements in 2007 which practically put Georgia’s political cooperation format with the EU in the same range with the one established with the Western Balkans upon the basis of the SAA.
Exploring the Association Agreement between the European Union and Georgia further (similar for Ukraine and Moldova), we can detect a strong attempt to bring the political cooperation between the EU and Georgia to the highest possible level in both depth and scope. The Agreement intents to: “…increase the effectiveness of political cooperation and promote convergence on foreign and security matters, strengthening relations in an ambitious and innovative way.” The deepening of political cooperation is viewed in the light of increased political and security policy convergence.
The application of the Association Agreement extends to areas such as the promotion of international stability and security based upon effective multilateralism, the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international security and crisis management, addressing global and regional challenges and key threats, the promotion of the principles of territorial integrity, inviolability of internationally recognised borders, sovereignty and independence, peace, security and stability on the European continent, the field of security and defense, and regional cooperation.
Seemingly, as a tacit reference to Article 21 of Chapter 1 (General Provisions of the Union’s External Action) of the Union’s founding treaty (TFEU), the Association Agreement with Georgia in the part of cooperation in CFSP matters as one of the objectives sets to: “…strengthen respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including media freedom and the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and to contribute to consolidating domestic political reforms.”
A special provision form AA concerns cooperation in issues of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and crisis management, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and export control. Cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management embodies a truly pro-active objective of Georgia’s possible participation in EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations.
No other agreement signed by the EU with third countries (excluding NATO allies) is as precise and ambitious in committing initiatives in the field of political cooperation and security. It is well demonstrated that even in its agreements with the Western Balkans the EU did not go into such details and left much space for the political format to decide upon the scope of interaction between the partners.