According to the Director of the Regional Studies Center, Richard Giragosian, Armenia has a unique opportunity to improve the relations with the EU and Iran
– Mr. Giragosian, a mandate for negotiations on a new agreement between the EU and Armenia was given. If the expectations from the Armenian authorities on the political element can be envisaged clearly, then the economic element is not so clear. Under Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union, how should Armenia regulate its relations with the EU?
-Armenia has a rare “second chance” to salvage relations with the European Union, despite its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). With fresh negotiations set to begin with the EU over a new a legal framework of relations between Armenia and the European Union, this second chance will rebuild relations and offer the Armenian government a way to regain and restore trust and investor confidence.
The recent EU official mandate to start formal negotiations over a new legal framework for relations between Armenian and the European Union means that despite the Armenian president’s controversial decision to sacrifice an Association Agreement, and related deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement in 2013, both Brussels and Yerevan have demonstrated a new sense of political will, representing a rare second chance to restore and repair Armenian relations with the EU. And although the new agreement will not be on the same level of cooperation in economic terms, there are enough areas beyond the framework of Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union to deepen and expand trade and economic ties.
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– The United States and European Union announced about the commencement of the process of lifting the sanctions against Iran. Recently, Iranian First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri visited Yerevan. In his words, Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union opens a new door for the development of economic relations between the two countries. How prospective do you consider this idea?
-The recent visit to Armenia of Iran’s First Vice-President was significant, especially as after the gradual removal of sanctions on Iran as the Western-brokered nuclear deal is implemented, one should expect the Islamic Republic to get more actively involved particularly in regional political and economic relations. In fact, the visit follows a similar reciprocal visit by the Armenian prime minister to Tehran and represents an opportunity to explore a deepening of relations between Armenia and Iran, post sanctions, post agreement, but there is also a danger. If this visit is in preparation for the planned visit of the Iranian President Rouhani, it is a very positive step forward. If, however, it’s a replacement, instead of the planned visit by Iranian President Rouhani, then it will be a missed opportunity.
There is also possible long-term benefit from Armenia’s rather unique position within the EEU, as seen in the potential for Armenia to leverage the ongoing opening of Iran. This is a geopolitical opportunity for Armenia, rooted in both Iranian and Armenian efforts to overcome a shared sense of isolation and to cooperate and complement in deepening ties, especially given Armenia’s well-positioned advantage to leverage opportunities from Iran’s reintegration into the global economy. With a significant potential to expand relations in the economic and energy sectors, Armenian government officials have already stepped up their engagement of Iran, and the coming visit of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani will likely further accelerate a deepening of ties.
Yet the obstacles for Armenia are numerous, with possible Russian pressure a real impediment to how far Armenia can go in expanding relations with Iran. Nevertheless, the regional implications of an ascendant Iran offer serious opportunities for Armenia, mainly in terms of altering the delicate regional balance of power and influence in Armenia’s favor. For small, landlocked Armenia, the dividends from its twin advantages of geographic proximity and position as a stable and friendly neighbor are significant. Engaging Iran also helps Armenia to offset its isolation, due to the fact that with two of its four borders closed, Armenia’s alternative route for trade and energy through Iran represents an important pathway to project its own influence.
While the economic benefits of Armenia’s role as a platform for Western engagement and Iranian exports, the outlook for energy ties is more problematic. For Russia, as a major geopolitical loser from the success of the Western deal with Iran, which makes Moscow both less attractive and much less necessary for Tehran, there will be little incentive for allowing Armenia to escape the Russian orbit so easily. And given Armenia’s pronounced dependence on Russian gas imports, the potential of an expansion of Armenian-Iranian energy ties will be the first target of Russian pressure. Perhaps most importantly, Armenia is the only stable neighbor for Iran, with a deep degree of stability and cooperative relations. More recently, with several high-level visits of Armenian officials to Iran this year, and the planned visit to Armenia by the Iranian president, there is renewed interested in expanding trade and transport ties.
Despite these obvious challenges and limitations, the strategic “opening” of Iran offers a strategic opportunity for Armenia, rooted in the country’s role as a potential “bridge” or “platform” for engaging Iran. And as a member of the EEU, Armenia can also serve as a “bridge” for Iran.
– As it is known, the US Congressmen elaborated a project consisted of three elements, with which they called upon the OSCE, the US Department of State and personally co-chair Warlick to refrain from the widespread practice of artificially putting an equality sign between the sides during the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, they were also suggesting to install special technical devices in the front line under the auspices of the OSCE, which will record the whole movement. The OSCE Minsk Group US Co-Chair, James Warlick, recently, responding to the US Congressmen recommendations, in his interview with the American Public Television, said that he fully supports the initiative of the Congressmen Royce and Engel. What do you think, will this idea periodically voiced by the US to conduct a relevant investigation of the incidents in the contact line be accomplished? Will Russia and Azerbaijan agree with it?
-There has been little evidence of any progress in the negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh, as the two sides are simply too far apart. Aside from the broader contradiction between two relevant provisions of international law (the opposing principles of self-determination vs. territorial integrity), the Karabakh conflict is viewed quite differently by each of the contesting parties. For Armenia, anything short of outright independence or unification with Armenia for Karabakh is unacceptable, although there has been some flexibility on the Armenian side over the terms and duration of a possible transition stage toward final status of Karabakh.
As the diplomatic positions on both sides remain far apart, the outlook for the Karabakh peace process is fairly bleak, with no real expectations for any breakthrough in the situation over Karabakh for at least the coming 5-10 years. The only expectation for any substantial change stems from two possible scenarios. the possible outbreak of hostilities, as the much larger and wealthier Azerbaijani side continues to threaten war over Karabakh, and a second, less likely scenario, whereby a democratic revolution or change in leadership in Azerbaijan results in a change in Azerbaijan’s diplomatic position on the conflict.
More recently, there has been little progress in the negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh, as the two sides are simply too far apart. Aside from the broader contradiction between two relevant provisions of international law (the opposing principles of self-determination vs. territorial integrity), the Karabakh conflict is viewed quite differently by each of the contesting parties. For Armenia, anything short of outright independence or unification with Armenia for Karabakh is unacceptable, although there has been some flexibility on the Armenian side over the terms and duration of a possible transition stage toward final status of Karabakh.
On the other hand, Azerbaijan offers nothing more than a degree of autonomy for Karabakh, but premised on the return of Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Given this divide, the real challenge now stems more from the more maximalist position of Azerbaijan, which demands the return of both Karabakh and the Armenian-held territories, but remains unwilling or unable to offer any reasonable compromise.
Thus, the current state of the peace process is limited to a “back to basics” policy, with two main objectives. to maintain the Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue on the presidential and ministerial levels and to prevent the outbreak of hostilities while strengthening the cease-fire regime. At the same time, the OSCE Minsk Group is coming under increasing pressure from some European states to allow a greater or more direct role for the European Union (EU) in the mediation effort, and to seek new ways to bolster the peace process.
Emma Gabrielyan
Aravot Daily
