According to the “Jamestown Foundation” columnist and political analyst Armen Grigoryan, under the event of growth of escalation by Russia, various dangerous consequences are possible
– Mr. Grigoryan, if initial Azerbaijan was carried out provocations thru spinners and sabotage-reconnaissance groups, then since March 2015, it put various types of artillery and then mortar rocket and armored vehicles into action. What is the purpose of Azerbaijan: resumption of war or maintenance of tension? What does Baku benefit of its behavior as such?
– I think that the maintenance of tension is for carrying out pressure not only against the Armenian side but also for sending a message to the mediators, more to say, to the United States and France that the settlement is possible only with its terms, in other words, thru unilateral concessions. Of course, Azerbaijan’s stance with continued escalation of tension and increase in number and capacity of weapons in use, to some extent increases the risk of war in the form of “accidental” war, when the situation can simply get out of control in a moment. As to what Baku benefits of such behavior, we can assume that if the main recipients of its blackmail do not do what it wants, then its benefit remains to have trade with Russia on certain issues.
– On December 21, in Moscow, at the CSTO Collective Security Council session, Serzh Sargsyan’s speech was assessed unexpectedly harsh. Although at the end of the CSTO Summit, during the press conference, he noted that the CSTO countries support Russia on the incident with the Russian “Su-24” military aircraft, and Armenia as Russia’s ally expresses its solidarity and support to Moscow’s stance. However, what do you think, will the fact of bringing the support of the NATO countries, particularly the “unreserved support of Greece to Turkey” as an example in his speech will have an impact on the attitude to Armenia, or as many people think that S. Sargsyan’s speech was not unexpected for Moscow.
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– Indeed, I do not think that it was unexpected for Moscow. First of all, we can recall that a few days ago, Y. Khachaturov hurried to make a statement about the “Su-24” in the name of the heads of the CSTO HQ, which was criticized in the Russian media while the representatives of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan announced that they have not authorized Y. Kachaturov to act on their behalf. He simply had acted in accordance with the interests of Russia.
“Jamestown Foundation” columnist and political analyst Armen Grigoryan
In its turn, in the case of the CSTO Collective Security Council session, Serzh Sargsyan’s speech with its key part, particularly bringing the example of the “unreserved support of Greece to Turkey”, could also take place by any representative of Russian in the context of “Su-24”. To the point, recently, Foreign Affairs Minister Sh. Kocharyan noted that S. Sargsyan’s speech was followed by an agreed stance expressed in the presence of journalists: the criticism against Turkey. In other words, again, Russia’ interest was pressed forward. Although, apart from Armenia unreservedly acting by Russia, the support of other CSTO member to Russia expressed as default in the best case. There would be no change in the attitude to Armenia. The CSTO members, essentially, have never concealed that they have no intention to defend Armenia from Azerbaijan.
– Citing Azerbaijan’s stance for several times within the CSTO and not receiving the desired response, Yerevan officially strongly criticized the CSTO and this criticism is continued even today. RA Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan, a few days ago, in an interview to “Liberty” RFE/RL, noted, “The CSTO should have responded to the downing of the Armenian helicopter in Karabakh a year ago as it responded to the downing of the Russia aircraft by Turkish forces.” In what case can Russia and the CSTO, in your opinion, go to tough moves? Generally, do you consider the critical statements possible?
– In the same interview, Sh. Kocharyan also noted that the CSTO is obliged to express adequate stance “if we really want to have an influential military-political structure rather than formal.” But the problem is that the CSTO is not a “powerful military-political structure” rather than a formality as initially, the only reason for its creation was not the common interests of its member states but Russia’s morbid imperialistic ambitions. CSTO members have no common interests, often they have conflicting interests. There can be no question about tough moves against Azerbaijan because it directly conflicts with the interests of the CSTO members.
– Neither easing nor confrontation of Russian-Turkish relations does not promise anything good to Armenia. What are the consequences of the escalation of Russian-Turkish relations for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh? How should Armenia behave itself to avoid the possible complications in these strained relations?
– Under the growth of tension by Russia, various dangerous consequences are possible, given that Armenia is the only place where Russian land detachments are deployed directly on the border with Turkey and Armenia has no control over the movement of the Russian detachments nor its airspace. In addition, under its growing isolation in the international arena, Russia can try also to deepen the isolation of Armenia, and at the same time, Russia continues supplying Azerbaijan with weapons by contributing to the further growth of tension in the Karabakh conflict zone. Armenia, first of all, should not be guided by the interests of Russia. In perceiving this simple principle, it will be already possible to calculate what actions are necessary to take in the spheres of security, political and economic. However, particularly much-needed reforms in the economic sphere enter directly into a contradict also with the members of the ruling pyramid, which furthermore complicates the situation.
– Baku officially is repeatedly talking about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement recommendations offered by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. In your opinion, does Azerbaijan divert attention in the contact line lately, from the tension in Armenian-Azerbaijani border, from the calls of emphasizing the impermissibility of escalation by the international community, or there are some agreements between Russia and Azerbaijan. Incidentally, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin also spoke recently about Russia’s “active efforts”, “Recently, a series of consultations have taken place between Sergey Lavrov and Azerbaijani and Armenian partners, during which the whole complex issues for the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were considered.”
– Earlier, Russia had also tried to replace the OSCE Minsk Group or to push its projects forward parallel to its activities. We can particularly recall the invitation of S. Sargsyan and I. Aliyev to Sochi in the summer of 2014 after the escalation in the conflict zone when S. Lavrov announced about some “trilateral format” and the plans to form a contact group outside the scope of the Minsk Group. At the same time, Azerbaijan does not conceal a long time ago that removing the settlement process from the Minsk Group format would be highly desirable for it. In this respect, Russia’s and Azerbaijan’s interests coincide, though Azerbaijan is continuously under the pressure of Russia, particularly because of the desire to expand the EaEU, and under the Russian-Turkish conflict, Baku is exposed to additional pressure. In this situation, Armenia must again emphasize its commitment to the Minsk Group format, particularly seeking to implement the proposals on development of mechanisms to investigate the border incidents.
Emma GABRIELYAN,
“Aravot” daily
