“Aravot” conducted an exclusive interview with Marchey Falkowski, an expert on the Caucasus, Turkey and Central Asia Department, Poland Eastern Studies. Polish analyst presented his observations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and on the 4-day war in the Karabakh-Azerbaijani border in early April. Note also that Mr. Falkowski has worked at the Polish Embassy in Armenia in 2010-2013.
– Mr. Falkowski, on April 2-5, unprecedented military actions took place in Karabakh-Azerbaijani contact line after 1994, and armored vehicles, artillery and rocket, military helicopters and drones were used, also, a large number of staff was attracted. What were the preconditions behind these events, and why did it happen right now?
– The escalation of the unresolved problem was largely expected by Azerbaijan, which for known reasons is not in favor of the status quo. Baku considers the Nagorno-Karabakh and its adjacent territories that were occupied by Armenia during the war its own and has never concealed that in the event of a convenient opportunity and lack of diplomatic successes, it will try to capture these territories back. Why did it happen now? I think for two reasons: the first one is due to the internal political life of Azerbaijan, the second one due to geopolitical factors. At present, Azerbaijan as a state and Ilham Aliyev’s regime is experiencing major economic challenges, the country faces a social instability. The Azeri authorities could decide that they needed a war to distract the people’s attention from these problems. We can say that they succeeded. After the four-day war, one could see a euphoria in Azerbaijan. Everyone was rejoicing that the Azerbaijani army managed to capture not big territories around Karabakh. As for the geopolitical factor, it seems to me that Baku, especially recalling the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, could not go for escalation of relations without getting a green or at least a yellow light from Moscow, which has its own interest in this region and its own game.
– Militarily, the status quo was not undergone to principal changes despite the fact that Azerbaijan was trying to implement its aggressive objectives. But what has been changed after the four-day war in the South Caucasus in military-political aspect? Did we come close to the settlement of the conflict or the recurrence of what has happened is more likely, the resumption of a full-scale war?
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– I agree that the status quo did not undergo principal changes in military terms. But politically, there were changes. First of all, Azerbaijan proved (primarily, to itself) that it can and is able to go to war. Azerbaijanis have a big trauma in the 90s war, I can even say that they are afraid of Armenians. The latest collision helped them at least to partly overcome this complex. It is good for Azerbaijani but bad for Armenians. Pay attention that Azerbaijani society was basically rejoicing during the war, while in Armenia, in spite of the number of volunteers, there was cautious. The next change was the clinical death of the Minsk Group which showed itself in no way during the collision. The same applies to the West, including the US and EU. It comes to confirm that unfortunately the West departs Caucasus very quickly by leaving this region to Russia and Iran. The next change is the serious blow to the so-called Armenian-Russian friendly relations and the serious crisis in the bilateral relations on the Yerevan-Moscow line. I can even take a risk and put forward a thesis that the time of the occurrence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has somehow come back when Armenians were opposing Moscow and the anti-Russian sentiments in Armenia were very strong.
– In your opinion, what is the role of Russia and Turkey in the possible developments of this issue and in the peace process?
– Let me start with Turkey because, in my opinion, everything is very easy. I do not see the Turkey’s role in the developments on Karabakh. It just has no lever of influence here. The only chance is to influence through Baku but Azerbaijan will do nothing against Russia in the Russian-Turkish conflict. Aliyev is a crazy politician. Because of having no chance and accepting a “polite friendship offer” by Moscow, he bets on Russia, which I think is trying to change territories around Karabakh, and perhaps, Baku’s agreement to deploy Russian peacekeepers is something serious, or Azerbaijan’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union, or its involvement in Moscow’s energy transactions, or for something else. We can only guess. The problem is that in this game, Armenia acts solely as an instrument. It seems to me that many people in Armenia know about it but unfortunately the field for maneuvering is small or does not exist at all. In the case of refusing the Russian-Azerbaijani terms, I do not exclude that there will be inner shakings in Armenia. In the near future, a very dangerous period is expected for Caucasus, especially for Armenia.
– In your opinion, what can be changed in the policy of the US and European states with different involvements in conflict settlement in order to ensure the best conditions for the conflict settlement (especially given that the shortest route connecting Europe with Iran passes thru the South Caucasus)? And what are the opportunities of Poland in this relationship?
– As for the policy of the West, the issue does not refer to the policy towards Karabakh or the Caucasus but generally to the global policy. The West, especially Europe, now experiences an existential and internal crisis. This is not the West that we knew: strong and unrestrained that rules the world and influences the processes going on around it. The main feeling in Europe is the fear for immigrants’, Middle East’s and Africa’s instability and Russia’s economic crisis. Plus the passivity and the unwillingness to enter into the deceits going on in the world. The Central European countries look at all of this differently but they too do not have the influence and power that France or Germany has. I do not want to be pessimistic but I cannot say otherwise: we should not cherish great hopes on the West, which would give the whole Caucasus to Russia with great pleasure to only be forgotten and left alone.
Hripsime HOVHANNISYAN, “Aravot” daily
