Lavrov has made a very remarkable and essential announcement in Baku, implying that Russia shares the positioning of Washington and Paris as regards the conflict resolution. In practice, this means that Russia makes Azerbaijan, so to say, be aware not cherish pointless hopes. On this the Turkish President announced days ago, after the meeting with Putin in Sochi, returning to his country and telling the journalists that he had brought up the issue of the “return” of 5 districts, but the President of the Russian Federation, being in favor of this option, had not considered this possible nevertheless. Putin, in fact, has not given Erdogan hopes, Lavrov has broken Aliyev’s hopes announcing he shares the opinion of Washington and Paris.
The issue is, that this is not a regular announcement, if we take into consideration that Aliyev has been almost publicly blaming Washington and Paris for having pro-Armenian positioning and for rejecting Azerbaijan’s “fair” demands, issues of territorial integrity for a long time. Aliyev has announced all that too often, too openly and transparently, via direct speeches, and if Lavrov announces about sharing the opinion of Washington and Paris in those conditions, comments become senseless. Assuredly, we do not speak of the announcement disapproving of Washington and Paris positioning. The issues is that Lavrov could simply skip touching upon that, especially in Baku. However, he has spoken and by that, of course, a lot of questions receive their answers.
From another perspective, of course, there is no sensation in place here if we merely judge proceeding from the logic of the process. April war has proved the criminal character of the Russian policy towards Armenia. Now Russia, so to say, passes a “rehabilitation phase”. It is very difficult to say how long that phase will last. At the same time, it should be noticed that this phase is not conditioned by a sole factor of a proven crime. Moreover, the launch of that phase has been given by that, but the process is conditioned by geopolitical factors, which are currently manifold and make Russia reconsider its policy in Caucasus, particularly as regards Armenia.
From that angle, not immediate reconsiderations are noticed within Moscow’s actions, that is, here it is precisely noticeable that simply no alternative approaches and even visualizations are present, and Armenia is continued to be perceived not as a partner and an equal ally furthermore, but as an outpost, if not a vassal in the best sense.
Presently it is also evident that Armenian authorities do not step towards changing the situation, perhaps counting on the collapse of the remnants of Russian old policy on its own. However, Moscow’s shift of attitude towards Azerbaijan may be already estimated as the lesser of the two evils.
Musa MIKAYELYAN
