Recently in parliament, Prime Minister Pashinyan said that the Armenian authorities, unlike the Azerbaijani leadership, did not have a concept for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. If we are talking about Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and himself, it is difficult to argue with that statement. There was a concept until 1998, and it was formulated during the first Artsakh war. We are occupying the regions around the former Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in order to return some of them to Azerbaijan in exchange for the internationally recognized status of Karabakh. Ter-Petrossian’s approach did not find support in part of his team, as well as in the majority of Armenian citizens. After that and until today, there is really no concept. To say that the solution should satisfy the people of Armenia, Artsakh, and Azerbaijan was not a concept, it was just nice words; at best, a good wish that did not come true. In the end, Azerbaijan found a solution that mainly satisfies them and does not satisfy us at all.
Even now, the Armenian authorities regularly talk about normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Unlike “ultra-patriots,” I think it is a vital necessity. But even now, in fact, it is not said on what basis this will happen. Recognizing the territorial integrity of those countries or making reservations about it? Accepting that there is a small piece left from the Artsakh Republic or not agreeing with that reality? Do we officially consider Shushi and Hadrut occupied or not? Should a document similar to the 2009 Zurich Protocols be signed with Turkey, or should resolutions based on completely different ideas be developed?
Usually, when there is no concept, the authorities “disperse” such issues with the following sentences: “All this must be decided during the negotiations.” Or, “our approach is based on the principle of self-determination of nations.” But are Turkey and Azerbaijan, which, as we found out, have a concept, ready to negotiate on that principle? If they are not ready, and we are not ready for their terms, then isn’t the negotiation situation basically the same as in 1998-2018, with the difference that the parties that won the war have grounds to significantly strengthen their position? And if so, doesn’t the current situation contain the danger of a new war?
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Aram Abrahamyan
