According to some sources, in late 1991 or early 1992, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the following conversation took place between Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk. “Do you know, Leonid Makarovich, that Crimea is ours?” “No, dear Boris Nikolayevich, it is not yours, it is ours.” And that’s the end of the conversation. Why didn’t Yeltsin continue? Was he more “democratic” than Putin (if democracy at all matters here)? Was he less patriotic than Putin? Was he less convinced that Crimea was part of Russia? In my opinion, the answer to all these questions is no. Yeltsin simply did not have the military or political capabilities to annex Crimea to Ukraine at that time. “International law” and “historical justice” play a secondary role here. Politics is not about them; it is about the real balance of power.
Aliyev was able to occupy most of Artsakh not because it’s allegedly “in line with international law” and thus “complied with UN resolutions” (those explanations are ridiculous in their cynicism), and even more so not because that Artsakh is “the historical land of Azerbaijan.”
Azerbaijan simply had political and military opportunities to occupy Artsakh. Let’s list some of them. 1) Azerbaijan received the full military support of Turkey, as a result of which the armed forces of the two countries acted as one joint army, 2) Our diplomacy was unable to ensure that Turkey wouldn’t have direct participation in the war, as was the case in 1992-1994, 3) Our army did not have enough resources to resist the Turkish-Azerbaijani army (this is the current government’s favorite political thesis, but it is one of a long line of problems), 4) Russia was interested in deploying its peacekeepers in Artsakh, 5) Russia is not strong enough to oppose Turkey, and it is implementing many economic and military-technical projects with Turkey, 6) Azerbaijani diplomacy in 26 years managed to convince the world that “under international law” Artsakh is part of Azerbaijan (which is a sign of the weakness of our diplomacy), 7) The coronavirus, change of government in the United States, and, for a number of other reasons, the West could not intervene in the development of the events in Armenia, 8) State institutions were weakened as a result of the revolution, which is shown by the “masses’” attack on parliament and the courts, as well as “PR protests” in the army, 9) The leader of Armenia was not serious about the peace talks because of his excessive ambitions and self-confidence, 10) Aliyev calculated that for the same reasons, the Armenian Prime Minister would not stop the war until “the knife reaches the bone.”
These were the opportunities of Azerbaijan, which it made use of. Now is the time for us to create opportunities for ourselves, taking into account the above, and perhaps many other points.
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Aram Abrahamyan
