Aravot.am’s interlocutor is political scientist Armen Vardanyan
– Nikol Pashinyan stated at the press conference that there was no official offer to join the RA, the Russian-Belarus Union State. Still, the ongoing talk by experts can be considered unofficial pressure. According to Pashinyan, Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan also had them in mind when he spoke about the pressures on Armenia on that occasion. How do you qualify such a statement by the head of the country? After such a statement, how seriously should Nikol Pashinyan be treated at various platforms and meetings where he will represent the interests of Armenia?
– The problem is that Russian policy is mainly based on the tactic that proposals are often made indirectly, or the Russians create a situation when countries take such steps that are in Russia’s interests. For example, in 2013, On September 3, when Armenia’s entry into the Eurasian Union took place, Russian officials, including those at the highest level, announced Armenia itself requested to join the EAEU. Meanwhile, in 2013, Armenia wanted to avoid joining the EAEU. At that time, Armenia had negotiated the EU Association Agreement for 3.5 years, and Armenia wanted to sign that agreement, while we saw that Armenia appeared in EAEU overnight. Russia presented it as if Armenia expressed such a wish, but it was obvious that it happened due to pressure.
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So, Russian politics is often carried out like that. A direct proposal is not made, it is produced through blackmail and threats, and such a situation is created that many countries give in to the pressure. In this context, Armenia could not be offered directly to join the Union States. Still, some Russian officials and experts raise the issue of joining the Union State during meetings with representatives of the RA authorities or in public statements. Regardless of everything, Armenia does not so acutely face this issue as it was in 2013; before September 3. It was manifested through the Russian blackmail policy. Nowadays, Russia has enormous problems with Ukraine, the position of that country is weakening day by day in the world, and it doesn’t have such great resources as opportunities to bring Armenia into the Union States.
– Do you agree with the Prime Minister, can conducting CSTO military exercises in Armenia create a threat to the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem when, as Nikol Pashinyan presents, the CSTO does not specify what their area of responsibility is? And does Armenia know what the zone of responsibility is?
– I do not consider CSTO military exercises in Armenia as a threat to either Turkey or Azerbaijan because the CSTO, with its activities and behavior, has made Turkey and Azerbaijan not afraid of them. It is no coincidence that Azerbaijan declares that Azerbaijan has more allies within CSTO than Armenia. Neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan considers the CSTO a threat. I think that Armenia’s refusal to hold CSTO military exercises on the territory of Armenia was more of a diplomatic démarche. During the last year, Armenia has been making diplomatic démarche against the CSTO and Russia in various ways because Armenia is not very satisfied with the behavior of the CSTO. I’m considering giving up exercise in this series.
– In your opinion, what was the main message delivered at Pashinyan’s press conference?
– To be honest, I expected sharper messages from Pashinyan’s press conference. For example, he will give a more concrete evaluation of the actions of the Russian Federation. It is evident that, in addition to Azerbaijan, Russia is also the beneficiary of the closure of the Lachin Corridor. Still, I would like the Prime Minister to specifically say, for example, what issue Vladimir Putin discussed at the informal meeting of the CIS countries’ leaders in St. Petersburg at the end of last year. After all, in the public part of the meeting, Pashinyan said he would discuss the Lachin Corridor issue with Putin. Now it would be good if the press conference talked about what position Russia has expressed regarding the closure of the Lachin Corridor, what was discussed with Putin, etc.
Unfortunately, that didn’t happen. And in general, the messages of the press conference should be considered in two dimensions: to the international community and the domestic audience. The first was that Armenia wants peace, is promoting the peace agenda, has no ambitions to take over the territories of Azerbaijan, etc. And for the domestic audience, it was said that we are making all efforts to solve the issues, but they are outside our domain; Azerbaijan and Russia should solve them.
Interview by Nelly GRIGORYAN
