by Stepan Piligian
Since 2018 and particularly after the 2020 war with Azerbaijan (and Turkey), the Pashinyan administration has advocated for what they refer to as the “peace agenda.” It is the belief of the Prime Minister that it is in the best interests of Armenia to secure a peace treaty with Azerbaijan and to normalize relations with Turkey. Both nations are considered longstanding enemies by their own unilateral actions. Pashinyan envisions a defined border with respect for each nation’s territorial integrity that would end hostilities.
The agreements with Turkey would open the western border to commerce and travel for the first time since 1993 and establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. Hard to argue with the goal. The question is always at what price and who will guarantee the peace? Self-governing is obviously not an option, and Russia’s presence would be a replay of the current Artsakh crisis. Pashinyan has been heavily criticized in Armenia and the diaspora for his continued commitment to this approach. He is acutely aware of the risk of escalation when responding to Azerbaijani provocations. They are intended to keep pushing Armenia toward compromise or outright capitulation. Many Armenians are frustrated by the lack of border integrity by Armenia as Azerbaijan continues its terror campaign on the eastern regions.
Read also
The strongest supporters for this strategy of peace, aside from his own political allies, are the western nations that continue to encourage bilateral talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve all open issues. This is no surprise since most third parties consider the current conflict a destabilizing factor for their own interests and would love nothing more than some form of agreement. From Armenia’s perspective, the problem is that they are more concerned about establishing peace rather than the content of the agreement.
Peace can be established by one party surrendering to the other’s demands and subordinating itself and its interests. Peace is always a compromise unless it is unconditional. Aliyev considers this the formality of a defeated nation. Here is the essence of the “peace agenda.” This is, in my view, the flaw with this perspective. The third parties are not insisting on a peace agenda that addresses the root causes and the “peace agenda,” and neither is Armenia. It seems to be a matter of short term convenience. Who will contain the racist intentions of the Turkish alliance? It is foolish to think an agreement will alter their strategic intent.
The global dynamics have shifted significantly in the last two years. With the war of attrition in the Ukraine, the east/west wall has emerged with its greatest definition since the fall of the Soviet Union. Ukraine, with its own set of democratic challenges, has become the proxy for the west in a narrative that is defined as freedom versus tyranny. Russia, for its part, has reached out for new partnerships as a result of the political and economic isolation from western sanctions. They are working with China in another extension of the global divide. Duplicitous and pseudo NATO ally Turkey is always a willing partner to deceive the west for its own interests, and the west tragically extends long-term forgiveness to the Turks. None of this is good news for Armenia. A wounded Russia is actually more dangerous in its relations with smaller “allies,” such as Armenia. Russia will adjust to the new geopolitical alignment, and some of their decisions, such as the relations with Turkey, are potentially harmful to Armenia. Putin has complete disdain for the European presence on Armenia’s border with the unarmed observers and competes with the EU and US in diplomatic outreach with Armenia. It is logical to assume that Russia would green light or at least ignore Azerbaijani escalation if it was to discredit the European presence.
Armenia is attempting to complete a “peace agenda” with two parties allied with each other who have yet to wipe the blood off their hands from their criminal atrocities committed in 2020. Aliyev has a stated goal to take Artsakh, Syunik and all of Armenia. Turkey, for its part, defines the diaspora and Armenians as “remnants of the sword” (survivors of the Genocide) and uses Azerbaijani aggression to further its pan-Turkish vision. Armenia is reluctant to initiate meaningful responses after each atrocity and continues with its “peace agenda.” Aliyev murders civilians and military while Armenia responds with its readiness for peace. While it is obvious that Pashinyan maintains this position to convince western democracies to support Armenia, the terms of support from the west are questionable.
History can be a great teacher. The French deceitfully abandoned Cilicia in 1920 reneging on their commitment to the Armenians and exposing them to further massacres. The Americans rejected President Wilson’s mandate for Western Armenia, crushing any hope for justice as a result of the Genocide. The causes for these missed opportunities lie in the lack of self-interest for the third parties. In the vernacular, it is referred to as “what’s in it for me.” A weak Armenia was in no position to offer “self-interest,” and predictable isolationism prevailed. What makes us think that the west can deliver this time?
Let us recall the events in Georgia in 2008. President Saakashvili of Georgia had come to power with a priority to fully reintegrate the rebellious mixed ethnic regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. His resolve was fully backed by Europeans and the United States. The western desire for access to the new oil pipeline through Georgia into Turkey that bypassed Russia and reduced dependency on Middle East oil was a major motivator for US support. The promise to expedite Georgia’s membership to NATO sweetened the budding alliance. When the Russian-backed rebel forces combined with the Russian military attacked the Georgian troops, the western support was non-existent. Certainly there was economic and post-war military assistance, and Georgia severed ties with Russia, but this new reality came at the price of the loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
These two regions became “independent” but a defective part of the Russian Federation. Ethnic Georgians were purged, and they lost two regions that total a little less than 50-percent of the size of the Republic of Armenia. While mourning its losses, Georgia had ample time to read all the letters of “outrage” from the west. Georgia has a great deal more to offer the west for its support with an oil pipeline, access to the Black Sea and its anti-Russian perspectives, yet it was isolated and humiliated by the Russians in 2008.
Recently, there has been bold talk in Armenia about leaving the CSTO, a military alliance led by Russia consisting of former Soviet states. The members are Belarus, Russia, Armenia and three central Asian majority Islamic nations. Belarus has never supported Armenia, and its strongman Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of Putin, has gone out of his way to embarrass Armenia. The three central Asian nations have consistently been reluctant to maintain the CSTO commitment to Armenia as it relates to Islamic Azerbaijan. Despite the tepid support from individual states, Russia is the power broker and has skillfully manipulated its inaction to the frustration of the Armenian government. Emotionally, leaving the CSTO is understandable. It is a mutual defense pact with no resolve. It is comparable to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty (mutual defense support for each member state) having no importance. Politically, however, it is impractical for Armenia to exit the CSTO.
What is the alternative? The west, unfortunately, has provided no tangible alternative that can be reliable. The example of Georgia should be a wall poster in Yerevan. Armenia has found out that joining this nefarious group is easier than exiting. While the anti-Russian rhetoric grows and provides an emotional release, it is a dangerous practice in the absence of support to fill the void. Foreign policy must be driven by practical resolve of the nation’s self-interest and not as an emotional response to humiliation. Armenia is clearly not respected by these nations.
Instead of trying to please others with responses that are at best risky to providing stability, we need to determine the cause of lack of respect and establish policies that improve our standing. Respect garners meaningful support from allies and serves as a deterrent to enemies. If Azerbaijan wantonly attacks Armenia and the latter’s response is tolerance, will our enemies respect us? If we cling to a peace agenda to ensure the hope of western support, what happens when the western support does not evolve beyond unarmed observers, limited financial assistance and countless non-binding resolutions? How will Russia react to the anti-Russian rhetoric by the government? Will it enable green lighting more Azeri terror? Armenia looks compromised because of the geopolitical circumstances but also because our policies are defensive. Peace agenda? For whom? What are our expectations? What are we willing to compromise, and what are our red lines? Azerbaijan behaves like a barbaric nation with no integrity as a negotiating player, yet we robotically cling to the “peace agenda.” The horrific response of the other party to the “peace agenda” should require some adjustments by Armenia.
The Armenian people deserve to know what is the “price” of the “peace agenda.” Deduction has determined that the self-determination of Artsakh is part of that price. This has already caused great consternation within our global Armenian nation. Is the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” also a chip, and would it be viewed as a tradeoff for Lachin? This must be a red line as any corridor is comparable to surrendering sovereignty. Russia would love to manage a compromise by being responsible for the corridor to serve its goal of reducing Armenia to a de facto part of the Russian Federation. Who believes that if “peace” agreements are signed that Azerbaijan and Turkey will cease their aggression? Are we willing to mortgage our future on an agreement that cannot be guaranteed? There is no precedent for Azerbaijan ever abiding by an agreement in 35 years.
Pashinyan recently stated we can have peace if we focus on the 29,800 square kilometers being recognized as Armenia, and we will not ever have territorial demands on others. These are large and bold statements. Our enemies and many Armenians will see them as forgetting Western Armenia, Artsakh and any other territories usurped over the years that have created a cause for injustice. Is this the price for the “peace agenda?” If so, the Armenian people have the right to know the government’s negotiating position. Such a critical position should be subject to a national referendum. We cannot create the veneer of generalities left to interpretation and then announce an agreement with our enemies. We need clarity, and the government has a responsibility to negotiate from a strong and clear position that will ensure a prosperous future. We should be concerned when many Armenians feel like outsiders and transparency is minimized.
