by Garik Poghosyan
The dissolution of NKR was a major psychological blow to the Armenian people. Done for the sake of the physical security of the civilian population in the context of a large-scale siege laid on the starving enclave, the document spelled the end of Armenian hopes that a Russian peace-keeping force on the ground was a guarantor of the continuation of an Armenian Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh-Nagorno Karabakh Republic or NKR- used interchangeably in this essay).
Around a century ago Diana Apcar, the honorary consul of the first Republic of Armenia to Japan, the first de facto female ambassador nicknamed “the stateless diplomat”, wrote a book- “Armenia Betrayed” in 1910 published by Yokohama: The “Japan Gazette” Press. The book described the Armenian massacres in Cilicia in 1909 and the helplessness of the civilian population vis-à-vis the great political game. After more than a hundred years, the concept of betrayal seems to be haunting the nation both from within and externally. Much of what domestic political forces and factions have had to quarrel over since the end of the 2020 war in Artsakh has been about betrayal: who betrayed who in what ways, when and for what reasons?! It seems the public is at a loss while political forces try their best to shun responsibility and point an accusing finger at each other. Apparently, what Armenian politics is in dire need of are statesmen who can own up to their wrongdoings, including strategic miscalculations, and offer a vision or road map in difficult times.
The occasional admission of past mistakes on the part of the opposition seems to be rather procedural and merely verbatim. Consequently, the absence of powerful and united opposition plays into the hands of the current government which avoids any meaningful discussion of its dramatic trajectory despite the fact that the widespread public perception of having political prisoners, mounting foreign debt, a rising crime rate, a widespread apathy are strong indications such an examination is publicly warranted. In these circumstances, the fate of the people of the former de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh is becoming increasingly vague.
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This essay suggests that if the de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh existed before (the infamous tripartite November 9, 2020 agreement between Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan that terminated the 44-day war, ceded much of what remained under Armenian control to Azerbaijan, trusted the fate of Karabakh Armenians to Russians and laid the groundwork for the eventual catastrophic exodus of the Armenians), then the recognition of the former NKR is still possible in a reverse order of state-building.
The formula is simple: if de facto states exist on the ground-physically and functionally- but lack recognition, then a former de facto state can continue its legal existence through recognition and then claim ownership of the land that was occupied by a colonizing power, in this case post-Soviet Azerbaijan with a Soviet nostalgia of Stalin’s territorial policies. Thus, the swap we suggest looks into the possibility of recognizing NKR first and then negotiating the territorial reemergence of the former de facto state. In other words, “first de facto, then de jure” is over and “first de jure, then de facto” begins its existence.
An international failure to uphold the rights of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh would mean a carte-blanche for more bloodletting and encroachment on fundamental human rights across the region, something that has the potential of destabilizing EU’s eastern and south-eastern frontier in no uncertain ways. The defeat of Armenians in Arstakh at the hands of the Azeri-Turkish coalition in 2020 was followed by the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, while the inhumane displacement of Karabakh Armenians was soon followed by a bold and mortal incursion of HAMAS into Israel. This in turn resulted in such a retaliation on the part of Israel that led UNICEF to claim, “Gaza has become a graveyard for thousands of children.”
The chain of events is ominous for the European security in terms of geographic proximity and defense. Professor Thomas Diez from the University of Tubingen believes securitization has replaced “humanitarianism and a spirit of cooperation”, something that he alarmingly calls “regressive.” This means the EU might need to take on a more direct and forceful responsibility in order to prevent sowing seeds of instability and violence at its doorstep and beyond. As of March, 2023, the German chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that “There needs to be a peaceful settlement in terms of the territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh citizens’ right to self-determination. These principles are equally applicable.”
Thus and thus, even though Karabakh has been emptied of its indigenous Armenian population, Karabakh Armenians continue to be bearers of the right of self-determination. Hence, at this stage, what matters most is to disentangle the possibility to implement the right from being the bearer of it. An inviolable right is a legal possession irrespective of the circumstances. To claim that Karabakh Armenians used to have the right to self-determination when they populated Karabakh but do not possess the same right after the forced migration would mean to claim that the loss of Ukrainian territories used to be a matter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity as Ukraine is not territorially integral after the Russian invasion or that the right of Israeli and Palestinian civilian population to life ceased to exist after their loss of life. The very absurdity of the examples is a reminder that inviolable rights are permanent in nature even when they are violated. In such cases common sense suggests they need to be restored or compensated for and the perpetrators of the violation brought to justice.
Hardly anyone would argue that a territory without a permanent population and institutions of self-government could be a state even though a territory is a must for a fully-fledged country to function properly. In a similar fashion, a separate legal-institutional entity and a social body with no fixed abode do not constitute a state by some definitions but continue to be a bearer of rights.
Consequently, a de-territorialized de facto state is possible and Nagorno-Karabakh is such. According to the Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, “state formation is not a once-and-for-all process nor did the state develop in just one place and then spread elsewhere. It has been invented many times, had its ups and downs, and seen recurrent cycles of centralization and decentralization, territorialization and deterritorialization.”
On a geopolitical plane, it is safe to assume by losing Artsakh the Russians lost a strategic foothold in a geopolitically and civilizationally significant region as it had traditionally been a pro-Russian cultural fortress amid its Islamic surroundings. In this context, as well as considering Armenia’s membership of Russia-led blocs and unions, one might be tempted to argue that the defeat of the Armenians was equally the defeat of Russia. Despite this, after an alliance agreement was signed between Russia and Azerbaijan prior to the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, media portray a Russia that is closer to the oil-rich autocracy-Azerbaijan-than its traditional ally, Armenia, something that Armenia will have to consider seriously in the coming decades, including within the realm of improving its marred relations with Moscow.
In the wider context of security, human rights and international law, however, the West, particularly Europe, will also be adversely affected by the irrevocable losses of the Armenians in the long term. In addition to the fact that a weak and vulnerable Armenia is easy prey for Russian geopolitical designs on the region (increased fears and vulnerability can easily be converted into deepened dependence on Russia), Europe will have to save its own face as a reliable alternative to Russia given its inability to prevent or cease the cruel displacement of the Armenians of Artsakh. Having said that, even though an Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh was arguably the “crown jewel” of Russia’s great power status as a force bolstering Armenia’s confidence, it would be naïve on the part of the European Union to suppose that once Armenia has permanently lost control over Artsakh, it will say its farewells to Russia: an admixture of dependence, geopolitics and civilizational ties are bound to have a long term impact of Armenia’s perception of its self. Hence, a more engaged and vociferous Europe would guarantee Armenia’s “dual alignment”, a concept propounded by Stefan Morar and Magdalena Dembińska.
Nevertheless, short-term calculations seem to dominate the regional political scene against the backdrop of the geopolitical turbulence caused by the on-going conflict in Ukraine. Some officials from the Russian Duma went so far as to approve of the dissolution of the de-facto state from the perspective of putting an end to hostilities, something that masked a Russian failure to admit the tragic consequences of their peace-keepers’ inaction. To make matters worse, it became obvious that the international law and institutions undergo a major structural shift-resolutions of supranational bodies and courts fall on deaf ears, while human security is increasingly vulnerable and largely unprotected.
To be precise, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 2508 on June 22, 2023, which explicitly stated that, “since 12 December 2022, the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, in Azerbaijan, has been denied free and safe access through the Lachin corridor, the only road allowing them to reach Armenia and the rest of the world. This has had serious human rights and humanitarian consequences, notably regarding freedom of movement, non-discrimination, access to healthcare and food, the right to family life and to education.”
The adoption of the resolution preceded the large-scale aggression against Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) of September, 2023, which was strongly condemned in another resolution of the Council of Europe. Interestingly, in its declaration to condemn the Azerbaijani military operation against the people of Nagorno-Karabakh adopted on October 17, 2023, the Spanish Senate explicitly admitted the death of hundreds of Armenians, a massive (which implies forced displacement) exodus of the population and reminded Azerbaijan of the fact that it is a party to the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, a rather straightforward allusion to the genocidal nature of the aggression. Earlier in the year, on February, 22, the International Court of Justice “ordered Azerbaijan to take all necessary measures to ensure unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo along the Lachin Corridor in both directions.”
Unfortunately, the power dynamics in the region resulted in a catastrophe that has further exacerbated the situation. As a result of the combination of Russian inaction and Western feeble attempts to discipline Azerbaijan, an energy-rich precious partner of some of Europe, the region was emptied-through horrific crimes– of its indigenous population for the first time in millennia. Homes, farms, infrastructure, hopes were left behind in an unexpected turn of events. Furthermore, Many ancient Armenian Christian monuments-a beloved cultural patrimony of native Armenians-are now in danger of destruction or appropriation (the precedent was set back in 2006 in Old Jugha, Nachijevan).
A look at the past reveals the Armenians have traditionally tried to please both the West and Russia in the hope that the inalienable right to self-determination will eventually triumph. Victorious but equally short-sighted previously, the Armenian diplomacy made several strategic blunders. In fact, the Armenians could have adopted a much more robust diplomatic stance, perhaps a much less desirable foreign policy option from the perspectives of Moscow and the West but a more surefire way to be understood in major capitals in terms of national interests and aspiration. Why wouldn’t Armenia recognize the independence of NKR having instead pinned all hopes on the OSCE Minsk Group? Why did the so-called Madrid Principles stipulate three universal principles for the purpose of the resolution of the conflict, including the right of self-determination, but vanished into thin air after the defeat of the Armenians? Why was the legitimacy of the pre-war NKR borders not a subject of negotiations considering the fact that the territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh were not even firmly embedded in Azeri jurisdiction?
Samvel Shahramanyan (the last or the latest President of NKR) (Source: ARMENPRESS)
To reaffirm his constructive and flexible but staunchly pro-Armenian profile, Armenia’s former president Serzh Sragsyan, who was ousted as a result of the Velvet Revolution of 2018, wrote an article on July, 6, 2021 stating that, “the international community should not recognize the outcome of the Turkish-Azerbaijani aggression but it should make efforts to reach a real, comprehensive and long-lasting resolution.” In a similar fashion, President of NKR, Samvel Shahramanyan, who had signed the decree of the liquidation of NKR earlier, told journalists and angry protesters later in Yerevan, “the Republic of Artsakh is not liquidated. No document can liquidate what was established by people.” Obviously, Mr Shahramanyan, too, referred to the right of self-determination and the possibility of legal-institutional existence of the Republic of Artsakh upon its physical disappearance.
