by Suren Sargsyan
Part 1
In my latest article for the Armenian Mirror-Spectator, I discussed the competition in the South Caucasus among key players: Russia, Turkey, the USA, and Iran. I analyzed recent developments in Georgia and the region’s competitive landscape. I’ve previously noted that the US views the South Caucasus as a whole rather than focusing on individual states, as regional influence is crucial for countering Russia, China, and Iran. Recent events further support the points I’ve made in my prior articles. Now I will try to review my previous assertions in the light of last week’s events.
Turkey’s recent statement pertains to its incursion into our region. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan remarked, “Just as we entered Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya, we could do the same to Israel. There is nothing we can’t do. We must only be strong.” This underscores Turkey’s expansionist policies in the South Caucasus and beyond under Erdogan’s leadership. Turkey, which significantly influences both Azerbaijan and Georgia, seeks to extend its influence in Armenia to solidify its position in the South Caucasus. On the same day, the special representatives for the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey, Ruben Rubinyan and Serdar Kılıç, agreed to evaluate the technical needs related to regional developments. This includes the operation of the Akhuryan/Akyaka railway border crossing and the facilitation of visa procedures for diplomatic and official passport holders from both countries. This indicates that both parties are actively working towards opening the so-called Zangezur Corridor, frequently mentioned by Erdogan, as Turkey would not agree to these steps without progress toward the latter, which is the main demand of its ally Azerbaijan.
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One day after Erdogan’s statement, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended the inauguration of Iran’s president in Iran. Notably, he met with Iran’s Supreme Leader, who reiterated the importance of Armenia’s territorial integrity and stated that the “Zangezur Corridor” is harmful to Armenia, asserting that foreign powers should not restrict relations between neighboring countries. Ali Khamenei further emphasized on his X page that the corridor does not serve Armenia’s interests and affirmed Iran’s commitment to this position.
Pashinyan did not respond to Khamenei’s remarks, and his press communication addressed nothing about the issue. This silence suggests that the Armenian government may align with the corridor’s concept, despite Iran’s clear opposition.
Suren Sargsyan
On July 30, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a subcommittee hearing to examine “The Future of Europe.” James O’Brien, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, was invited to testify. During the hearings, O’Brien stated that “We met with the prime minister several months ago and established a new platform to help Armenia reduce its dependence on Russia. It’s almost entirely dependent on Russia for its energy and its economy. We need to diversify.
So, making it possible for them to make the brave steps that the prime minister is leading them on which is a break with Russia. Russia is trying to make sure that anything that happens there happens on its terms, and I think both of those two countries are a bit frustrated by the involvement to be honest, and we are working very hard so that the express desire of peace can be manifested in an agreement.
I’ll just say one more thing about why that matters so much. Look at the map. From Central Asia which is not part of this committee but Central Asia all the way through. The Central Asian countries are incredibly rich and right now they’re only options to the global markets fundamentally are through Russia or China. If we can open up a route that goes through Azerbaijan and Armenia, then they will have access to global markets and much less dependence on Russia and China, so this is all a part again of allowing countries to choose their own paths to the global markets.” Basically, this is the most accurate explanation of the US interests in the region and overall, this is precisely the plan that the United States has for the South Caucasus.
Hours later Secretary Blinken stated that “The Biden administration suspended $95 million in US assistance to Georgia after its parliament adopted legislation related to foreign agents that critics say was inspired by a Russian law used to crack down on political dissent and that sparked weeks of mass protests. Blinken said that he had decided to pause the Georgian aid, which would directly benefit the government, as the result of a review of assistance that he ordered in May after the law passed. He said he took the action in response to “anti-democratic” actions the government has taken. The US has also already imposed visa bans on a number of Georgian politicians and law enforcement officials for suppressing free speech, particularly voices in favor of Georgia’s integration with the West. “The Georgian government’s anti-democratic actions and false statements are incompatible with membership norms in the EU and NATO,” Blinken said in a statement. This statement once again highlights the competition between Russia and the US in Georgia, which will have a significant impact on the fate of the region at large.
As a result of these statements and developments, we can once again note the interests of the main players in the South Caucasus.
USA: For Washington, having influence in the entire region is a priority because, through this, the US can more effectively counter the expansion of Russian and Chinese influence, including from the perspective of economic routes. At the same time, the spread of influence in the region, including through the corridor passing through Armenia would mean the isolation of Iran, which is one of Washington’s main political priorities.
Iran: For Tehran, naturally, such a prospect is undesirable. In Iran, it is believed that the opening of any extraterritorial corridor would mean the loss of an external border, which would have a highly negative impact on Iran, especially considering the economic sanctions imposed against Tehran.
Turkey and Azerbaijan: These two countries have common interests. First, weakening Armenia and making it economically dependent would render Armenia incapable of being a factor of any kind. Instead, it could simply become a crossroads through which anyone can pass and circulate any type of goods. This simultaneously makes Turkey a transit point for Central Asian energy resources to Europe. Previously, Europe depended on energy resources passing through Russia, but now it would depend on those passing through Turkey. At the same time, Turkey could physically unite the entire Turkic world by having a corridor.
Russia: For Moscow, the opening of regional communications is important, but Moscow insists that Russian peacekeepers/troops should be stationed along this corridor, which naturally contradicts Washington’s interests and Turkish interests. It is essential to consider who will control this corridor. Azerbaijan and Turkey prefer that no other state be involved, as it connects Turkey to Azerbaijan; they question why the troops of another country should be responsible for its security.
Armenia: For Yerevan, this prospect poses significant security challenges. Who will manage the security of this road? If another state controls it, an extraterritorial unit would effectively traverse Armenia, which would be catastrophic. If the Armenian armed forces manage it, different sorts of provocations from Turkey and Azerbaijan could lead to serious complications. Therefore, besides making extensive concessions, Yerevan should at least strategize the least risky scenario for itself, as Armenia finds itself isolated, seemingly conveying to regional powers, “You decide, and I will follow your lead.”