In mid-March, Stephen Whittock, the U.S. President’s special representative, visited Moscow, where he met with Putin before departing for Baku. Around the same time, Michael Waltz, the U.S. President’s national security advisor, spoke about the need to finalize the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and secure the return of Armenian prisoners. Additionally, there are reports that the U.S. will temporarily deploy military equipment in Armenia until the fall. Although Armenia’s Defense Ministry has not commented on this, it is likely that joint Armenian-American military exercises are being planned.
Some in Armenia have reacted to these developments with overly optimistic interpretations, along the lines of “Trump has forbidden Aliyev from attacking Armenia.” However, I believe the main theme behind these events is neither Armenia nor even Azerbaijan. The real focus is Iran—and the new game the U.S. administration wants to play with it.
Given Trump’s political style, this strategy will likely involve a combination of hard pressure and conditional offers, both advantageous and unfavorable. This is the same approach he is taking with Ukraine, where he has threatened to withhold military aid while considering harsher, more “painful” sanctions against Russia. Generally speaking, such tactics carry significant risks, and there is no certainty that they will yield benefits—not for the world, and not even for the U.S. itself.
What matters most for us is the role the U.S. has assigned to the South Caucasus in its geopolitical maneuvers with Iran. For Armenia, it is critical that we do not become an anti-Iranian bridgehead under any circumstances. In the long run, good neighborly relations with Iran are more valuable than any short-term gains.
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It is clear that the U.S. does not want renewed escalation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict while pursuing its Iranian strategy. However, we must also acknowledge two realities:
Preventing an Azerbaijani attack is not Trump’s—or Macron’s, Putin’s, or anyone else’s—primary concern.
Even if one of these leaders half-heartedly tells Aliyev, “Don’t do it,” there is no guarantee he will comply.
As we have seen, Azerbaijan (or rather, Turkey) has significant room to act independently and pursue its own objectives.
For this reason, we should not place too much hope in external factors. Ultimately, no one cares about the survival of Armenian statehood except us.
And, I suspect, even among Armenia’s own citizens, this issue does not trouble as many people as it should.
Aram ABRAHAMYAN
