by Benyamin Poghosyan
Russia is highly likely to remain a driver of geopolitical dynamics in the South Caucasus for the foreseeable future. The potential ceasefire in Ukraine may shift Moscow’s resources back to the South Caucasus and thus make Russia’s position stronger. The relations built since 1991 has given Russia leverage with Armenia, including the presence of Russian military base and border troops in Armenia, and Armenia’s membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), while Armenia was providing an opportunity for Russia to project power in the South Caucasus and foment its position as the strongest external player in the region.
Over the past four years, relations between Armenia and Russia have changed significantly, transforming Moscow from a strategic ally into a problematic partner. Both sides now harbor a lengthy list of grievances against the other. With the potential new chapter in Ukraine comes also an opportunity for both countries to reset their bilateral relationship and find a new modus operandi.
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According to the Armenian government, Russia has failed to fulfill its obligations under the 1997 bilateral agreement to protect Armenia during Azerbaijan’s incursions into Armenian territory in 2021 and 2022. Furthermore, Russia did not prevent Azerbaijan’s military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. Another major point of contention is Russia’s insistence on implementing Article 9 of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, while the remainder has been void given Azerbaijan’s and Russia’s noncompliance with it.
On the other hand, Russia accuses Armenia of “pivoting toward the West” by deepening cooperation with the European Union, France and the United States, inviting EU observers to Armenia while freezing its membership of and openly criticizing the CSTO. The signature of the US–Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter and discussions to sign a New Partnership Agenda with the EU have upset Russia.
Armenia has also drastically reduced its military-technical cooperation with Russia. Armenia sourced more than 90% of its weapons from Russia a few years ago. As of 2025, that figure has dropped to below 10%, with India and, to some extent, France emerging as Armenia’s primary partners in defense cooperation. Interestingly, Russia does not criticize Armenia’s military partnership with India, at least openly.
Despite these political and diplomatic tensions, bilateral economic ties are flourishing. In 2024, trade turnover reached $12.4 billion, from $2.5 billion in 2021. Russia remains a key destination for a significant portion of Armenia’s exports and is the primary source of several strategic imports, including wheat, while Russia is benefitting from re-export of multiple goods done via Armenia, a process started after the US and the EU imposed sanctions on Russia. The growing economic relations give Russia additional opportunities to use them as leverage against Armenia if Moscow deems this appropriate, but the re-export of billions of USD goods to Russia via Armenia also provides leverages for Yerevan.
Recent developments have also profoundly impacted Armenian public perceptions of Russia. While an overwhelming majority of Armenians viewed Russia as a friendly nation in 2018, that figure has now dropped sharply, as illustrated by the September 2024 International Republican Institute poll.
The current elusiveness of Armenia–Russia relations may pose significant challenges for Armenia. In the foreseeable future, Russia will likely remain one of the key external powers in the South Caucasus, with considerable leverage to influence the region’s geopolitics. It may well be with this calculation that the Georgian Dream since 2024 has reshaped the Georgian foreign policy trajectory to a more ambiguous one. In recent years, a marked increase in Russia–Azerbaijan cooperation started with the February 2022 statement of strategic interaction. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Azerbaijan in August 2024 was a prominent demonstration of this high-level partnership. Azerbaijan plays a significant role in Russia’s efforts to reach Iranian, Indian, and Southeast Asian markets via the International North–South Transit Corridor. Russia and Azerbaijan share a vision in which regional powers manage regional conflicts, and both support the 3+3 regional cooperation format. Despite recent tensions between the two sides triggered by the AZAL Baku–Grozny flight crash, and President Aliyev’s last-minute rejection of President Putin’s invitation to attend the May 9, 2025, military parade in Moscow, Russia continues to express its interest in developing relations with Azerbaijan, as was stated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, during a May 15, 2025, press briefing.
In the current environment, Russia may decide that it can pursue its interests in the South Caucasus through a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has been actively encouraging this perception among Russian leaders in various ways, including by funding Russian experts and academics to portray Armenia as an adversary of Russia while presenting Azerbaijan as friendly nation. These developments can further strain the relationship between Armenia and Russia.
If an “understanding about Ukraine” develops between Russia and the US under the new Trump administration, Russia would then have a greater capacity to shape regional geopolitics, while the US might stop viewing the region as another battlefield with Russia and thus reduce its involvement. In this context, Russia might resume — or more actively pursue — its role as the primary mediator in Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations and take actions to restrain Western presence in the region while seeking to manage its competition with Turkey in the South Caucasus. In such a scenario, Armenia could face demands from Russia to realign its foreign policy, particularly to limit its growing ties with the EU, European countries and the US.
Amid evolving regional geopolitics, with the South Caucasus possibly facing a situation with less Western influence and more from Russia, Armenia should avoid further deterioration of relations with Russia and seek a new modus operandi. In this context, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s decision to visit Russia on May 9 to attend the military parade was a step in the right direction. Armenia should continue to communicate frankly with Russia about the key goals of its foreign policy strategy, while resuming Track 2 dialogues with Russian expert circles to better articulate Armenia’s position and counterbalance Azerbaijan’s narratives.