by Benyamin Poghosyan
The June 2025 12-day Iran–Israel War and US military strikes targeting Iranian nuclear sites created shock waves in the Middle East and beyond. Iran and Israel exchanged strikes twice in 2024, but these were limited and mostly symbolic operations.
While the war did not solve critical issues between Iran and Israel, and there is a possibility of another escalation, it demonstrated the volatile nature of Middle Eastern geopolitics, shaped by evolving balance of power.
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Armenia is a neighbor of Iran, and this fact alone is enough to mean that Armenia will be affected by any Iran–Israel confrontation. However, there are other factors that can amplify the implications for Armenia of a potential long-term war against Iran.
First, the Israeli attack against Iran was another step in “legitimizing” the use of force to solve interstate tensions. This is bad news for Armenia, since it serves to validate the narrative of the president of Azerbaijan, who in recent years has reiterated many times that international law is in decline and the world is entering an era of “might is right.” Given Azerbaijan’s assertive and aggressive policy toward Armenia, and its consistent promotion of extraterritorial concepts such as the “Zangezur corridor” and “Western Azerbaijan,” the further legitimization of use of force against sovereign countries makes it easier for Azerbaijan to have a new attack on Armenia somehow accepted by external powers.
Second, in recent years Syunik has become a focus in geoeconomic and geopolitical tensions, as Azerbaijan demands from Armenia the establishment of the extraterritorial “Zangezur corridor” to reach the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic and Turkey. It will connect Turkey with Central Asia, boosting the Pan-Turkism ideas. Iran is opposing this scenario, viewing it as a direct threat to its vital national interests. Given Tehran’s military capacities and capabilities, Iran is probably the only tangible external hard-power factor deterring Azerbaijan from using force to open the “corridor.” Any significant decline in Iran’s capacities and capabilities might encourage Azerbaijan to use the window of opportunity and launch a military attack.
Third, Armenia has only two open borders, with Georgia and Iran, and up to 30% of Armenian foreign trade passes via Iran according to the Statistical Committee of Armenia. Any significant disruption of this transit can have drastic negative implications for the Armenian economy, and during the 12-day war Armenia was already beginning to face problems in maintaining import/export operations via Iran.
Fourth, internal destabilization within Iran may trigger the rise of separatist movements, including in northern Iran, which is populated by Azeri-speaking people. If this scenario is realized, instead of having Iran as a southern neighbor Armenia may face a “second Azerbaijan.” This would have severe geopolitical and geoeconomic implications for Yerevan, encircling Armenia with Turkic states or quasi-states.
Fifth, if there were significant internal destabilization within Iran, Syunik might face the influx of Azeri-speaking refugees, not only putting enormous pressure on the region’s health, educational, and social security services but also changing the safety and demographics of this critically important region, amounting to a “peaceful invasion.” Azerbaijan might use the presence of Azeri-speaking people in Syunik as a pretext for intervention.
Thus, while the 12-day war had no immediate, significant repercussions for Armenia, except for its momentary pause in import/export operations, it exposed Armenia’s geoeconomic and geopolitical vulnerabilities in case of major destabilization within Iran because of long-term war. As the possibility that Israel launches another attack on Iran exists, Armenia should be prepared for what this could enfold.
Armenian authorities should be prepared to face the increased likelihood of Azerbaijan using military force against Armenia, despite recent reactivation of the negotiation process. Part of its strategy should be the continuation of talks with Azerbaijan, but Armenia also needs additional military preparedness and communications with partner countries about the danger of military escalation.
The Armenian government should develop an emergency plan to minimize the impact of disruption of export/import operations via Iran if chaos should engulf Iran, including calculations of what percentage of operations might be rerouted via Georgia, how this could be done, and how the state might help businesses forced to cease operations. Continuation of negotiations with Turkey, aiming at the opening of the Armenia–Turkey border, should be part of the strategy, while keeping in mind the low likelihood of such a breakthrough.
The government should prepare an emergency plan to manage refugees coming into Armenia from Iran, including screening mechanisms at the border to prevent the influx of people who might pose a threat to Armenia’s security interests. Discussions should start with the UNHCR office [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees] in Yerevan and the leadership of Russian border troops deployed in Armenia.
The 12-day Iran–Israel War was a warning to Armenia highlighting the unstable nature of the status quo in the South Caucasus that emerged after the forced displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. This situation requires the constant monitoring of changing geopolitical realities, assessment of the main trends, and forecasting of the possible scenarios.