by The Armenian Mirror-Spectator
By George Meneshian
Many argue that the international system is undergoing structural change. The weakening of traditional hegemonies, the rise of regional powers, and the resurgence of geopolitical competitions have all disrupted the strategic status quo from the Indo-Pacific to the Eastern Mediterranean. In this new context, multilateral cooperation formats are no longer optional but essential. As states confront increasingly complex threats, shifting alliances, and overlapping spheres of influence, they are seeking new groupings that combine efficiency with political coherence. One of the most promising emerging alignments is the quadrilateral involving France, Greece, Armenia, and India, a format rooted in shared democratic values, security concerns, and political objectives. What has begun as a series of bilateral and trilateral initiatives must now evolve into a strategic synergy.
The growing convergence among these four states is not coincidental. It partially arises from the need to respond to the increasingly assertive Turkey–Azerbaijan–Pakistan axis, which has matured into a strategic bloc with growing military, economic, and diplomatic coordination. This trilateral format has demonstrated its operational capacity and regional ambitions, most clearly in the aftermath of the second Nagorno Karabakh war (2020), and continues to project influence beyond its immediate geography. In this setting, the France–Greece–Armenia–India format provides a natural and necessary counterbalance, one that is already being considered at the policy level.
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In March 2024, Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias publicly acknowledged the potential of a quadrilateral cooperation format in the defense sector involving Armenia, Greece, France, and India. His remarks are not merely speculative. They reflect a broader consensus forming among policy and scholarly circles that such a grouping is both viable and needed.
Armenia, at the heart of this potential format, is repositioning itself. Long reliant on Russian security guarantees, Yerevan has begun to reduce that dependency not only because of Moscow’s declining credibility, but also due to the urgency of modernizing its defense posture amid Azerbaijani pressure. Armenia has rapidly expanded its security cooperation with India, France, and Greece. India has become Armenia’s principal arms supplier, providing advanced artillery systems, anti-tank weapons, air defense platforms, and drone countermeasures. France has delivered armored personnel carriers and CAESAR artillery systems, while Greece has revitalized and institutionalized its long-standing bilateral military ties, through joint drills and multiple defense agreements. Plans for Greece to transfer Russian-origin air defense systems to Armenia further underscore this new trajectory. Armenia is also exploring participation in Greece’s Hellenic Center for Defense Innovation (ELKAK) and is engaging in industrial defense cooperation that would have been politically unthinkable a decade ago.
Each of the other three participants brings strategic value and mutual reinforcement to the proposed format. France, as a major European military power with a global outlook, is seeking to project its influence across both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific. Its deepening strategic partnership with India, one of the most robust North–South relationships in the world, includes arms exports, joint production projects of military hardware, and a shared Indo-Pacific strategy. Greece, for its part, has emerged as France’s closest partner in the Eastern Mediterranean. Over the past five years, the Greek military has modernized its arsenal by acquiring French-made Rafale fighter jets, Belharra frigates, and Exocet MM40 Block 3C anti-ship missiles. At the core of the Greek-French defense partnership lies the mutual defense clause outlined in the 2021 France-Greece Defense and Security Agreement. Greece has also expanded ties with India, including defense cooperation, naval exercises, and discussions over potential technology transfer and missile systems. Several of the Rafale fighter jets sold to Greece by France include electronic components manufactured by Indian defense firms, highlighting the already integrated nature of this emerging triangle. Both Armenia and Greece have also expressed strong interest in India’s Uttar Pradesh Defense Industrial Corridor (UPDIC), reinforcing the possibility of an extended defense industrial ecosystem.
The strategic benefits of this format are tangible for each participant. For Armenia, it represents the end of regional isolation and the decline of dependency on Russia, enabling its military modernization and strengthening its capacity to deter Azerbaijan. Even if Yerevan signs a peace treaty with Baku, it needs strong partnerships and military capabilities. For Greece, it opens a pathway to project itself as the EU’s and NATO’s strategic outpost in the Eastern Mediterranean, bolstering its efforts to counterbalance Turkish influence and enhance its role as a transit and defense hub between Europe and Asia. For India, the format supports its ambitions to expand westward, contain Pakistani and Chinese strategic outreach, reduce its reliance on Russian arms imports, and secure access to European markets. For France, the format consolidates its arms export leadership, secures access to India’s vast market, and reinforces its Indo-Pacific strategy while projecting influence across the Eastern Mediterranean and South Caucasus, two regions where Paris seeks to claim diplomatic relevance and counter Turkish and Russian presence.
Beyond defense, the rationale for this quadrilateral format is reinforced by its potential value to the European Union and the broader Western bloc.
First, it offers a rare and critical opportunity to anchor Armenia, a fragile democracy in a volatile neighborhood, more firmly within a democratic and pro-Western security architecture. This would mark a strategic setback for Russian, Iranian, and Chinese influence in the South Caucasus, where Western engagement has historically been limited.
Second, the format acts as a buffer against China’s strategic penetration into Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and South Asia. Through infrastructure investments, connectivity projects, and defense diplomacy, Beijing has successfully established a strong presence in regions where Western influence has diminished. A France–Greece–Armenia–India quadrilateral format would not necessarily confront China, but it could offer a viable alternative.
Finally, this format presents substantial opportunities for investment and economic cooperation, particularly in the defense and energy sectors. France and India are already pursuing joint production models that could be expanded to include Greece and Armenia. Greece, with its strategic ports and infrastructure, offers a critical gateway for Indian industries to access European markets. Armenia, in turn, provides a fertile landscape for defense and high-tech investment, especially as it diversifies away from Russian suppliers and seeks technology transfers and localized production.
In conclusion, the proposed France–Greece–Armenia–India format is not a reactive coalition but a strategic project of long-term significance. It reflects the emergence of a new kind of alignment; one that is not imposed by ideology or historical burdens, but constructed through opportunities, mutual interest, and shared challenges. The vision has been articulated, and the political groundwork has been laid. What is required now is the political will and institutional commitment to give this emerging alignment its formal shape. For the European Union and the democratic West, it is a chance to reinforce values and shape outcomes in some of the most contested and consequential parts of the world. That opportunity must not be missed.
(George Meneshian is a policy analyst specializing in the Caucasus and Middle East, currently serving as Head of the Middle East Research Group at the Institute of International Relations (IDIS) in Athens, Greece. He studied International Relations at Panteion University in Athens and earned his master’s degree in Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia Studies from the University of St Andrews in the United Kingdom. He has authored numerous articles and papers across various platforms and has been featured in multiple media outlets. In 2024, he published a book on Greek-Armenian relations — soon to be translated into English — and has co-authored four other books.)