What are the main narratives of Armenian reality?
Former Russian, now Israeli sociologist Victor Vakhshtein, in one of his recent lectures, addresses the question of when narratives (stories charged with a worldview) become more or less stable and influential. For this, it is necessary that narrative (in Armenian patum “story” meet four criteria:
a) Identity: affiliation with a particular group.
b) Moral distinction: a division between good and evil, clean and dirty, expressed also through the idea of time – this period was bright and prosperous, that one was dark and miserable.
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c) Spatial dimension: distinguishing between global and local good and evil.
d) Direction: where is the world going, where is my country going, where am I going.
Let us try, using these criteria, to identify the main Armenian narratives. But first, a caveat: with narratives, it does not matter whether they are true or false, fair or unfair. What matters is what large groups of people believe.
Criterion a) Identity: People may identify as “representatives of the Armenian people,” and in that case they naturally look for opposing groups hostile to their identity: Turks, Russians, “Sorosites,” the “formers,” the looters, the Nikol supporters. Two major narratives can be distinguished here (with many sub-variants):
We are the people, and they are the formers, looters, and Russian slaves.
We are the people, and they are Turkophiles, Sorosites, and Nikol supporters.
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b) Time: Bright vs. Dark Periods
Those over 60 often see history through one of two lenses:
Until the 1990s (sometimes until Gorbachev) everything—economy, healthcare, science, education, culture—flourished, and afterwards everything collapsed.
Until the 1990s there was communist autocracy, repression, stagnation, the senility of the Politburo. After 1990, a difficult but desirable path to freedom opened.
But there is no need to dwell too long on these two narratives, as people of my generation are gradually leaving the stage.
How are the “black” and “white” periods devidid in public narratives after 1991? Some common schemes:
1990s: cold and dark → 2000s: plunder → after 2018: sovereignty and peace. (The ‘cold and dark’ narrative has been partly carried over from the previous generation’s story of the ‘Soviet flourishing.’)
1990s: cold and dark → 2000s: victories-loss → after 2018: defeat, disasters.
1990s: victories → 2000s: consolidation of victories → after 2018: defeat.
1990s: victories → 2000s: plunder → after 2018: defeat.
Everything is black: 1990s: cold and dark → 2000s: plunder → after 2018: collapse.
Of course, there are shades of gray, but the main frameworks are clear.
Criterion c) Spatial Dimension: Here the division is straightforward:
Enlightened, democratic West (global good) – nationally elected government that freed us from Russia (local good) – backward, imperialist Russia (global evil) – Armenia’s “5th column,” the formers and looters (local evil).
Russia led by a strong leader striving for independence (global good) – patriotic Armenians aware of Russia’s role (local good) – degenerate, pro-LGBT West (global evil) – Sorosites (local evil).
Criterion d) Direction: These follow directly from the first three. If you believe in Armenia’s “victory” within the enlightened West, you likely see the country moving toward progress. If you believe Armenia is collapsing under Sorosite rule, you believe we are falling into an abyss.
A final remark: It is a mistake to think that narratives depend entirely on who, how, and how effectively manages to ‘feed’ something to the citizens. That is, of course, one factor—but not the only one.
Aram ABRAHAMYAN
