The Washington Declaration of August 8 marked the official launch of the “Zangezur Corridor” project.
According to Article 4 of the Declaration, Armenia and the United States, together with third parties agreed upon by both sides, will determine the main parameters of the so-called “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) program to be implemented in Armenia.
Even on the textual level, however, the document leaves open what the TRIPP program actually entails and what its core criteria are. In a region already marked by instability, such ambiguity inevitably generates new strategic concerns.
No matter how much the Armenian authorities insist that “peace has been established” and “there is no corridor,” the phrase “unimpeded passage” in Article 3 of the Declaration is sufficient to reveal that what is being proposed is far more than a mere road.
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Under genuine peace conditions, special infrastructures or legal regimes are unnecessary. When traveling, for example, from Armenia to Russia through Georgia, one may freely choose any checkpoint and route, passing through Tbilisi, Batumi, or Akhalkalaki without any special regime. The very need for a dedicated “corridor” indicates that peace has not been achieved, and sovereignty remains contested.
If implemented, the Zangezur Corridor would dramatically alter the regional power configuration weakening the strategic positions of Armenia, Iran, Russia, and Georgia. Georgia, in particular, would lose its transit relevance and its overland access to the Middle East – routes that would henceforth depend on Baku and Ankara’s “sponsorship,” deepening Tbilisi’s geopolitical dependence.
In this context, one option to restore balance of power is the Sadarak Corridor.
A glance at the map shows that the shortest route from Yeraskh (Ararat Province, Armenia) to Iran passes through the Sadarak District of Nakhichevan, a stretch of only 15–20 kilometers. Establishing this corridor, mirroring the proposed Zangezur one, would reintroduce equilibrium to the regional architecture of power.
The Sadarak Corridor would:
- Curb Azerbaijan’s unilateral demands for a “corridor” imposed under coercive rhetoric.
- Expand Armenia’s strategic maneuverability in regional negotiations.
- Preserve Russia’s and Georgia’s access to the Middle East through non-Turkish routes.
- Provide Iran with direct overland connectivity to the Black Sea and Russia.
Following the Washington Declaration, Iran’s Ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobani, notably remarked that if the matter is approached on a reciprocal basis, then just as Nakhichevan could be linked to Azerbaijan, Armenia could likewise establish a route to Iran through Yeraskh and Julfa.
Thus, the concept of a Sadarak Corridor does not contradict the Washington Declaration; rather, it operates within the same logic of regional connectivity and unblocking transport routes, yet on fair and sovereign terms.
It could function either as an independent initiative or as part of a broader multilateral transport framework. The essential principle, however, must remain unchanged: the preservation of Armenia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the right to equal and full participation in any new regional infrastructure.
P.S. The very notion of “corridors” remains inherently destabilizing. Such constructs institutionalize asymmetries of power and become perpetual sources of rivalry among regional actors. Nevertheless, the agreements of November 9 and August 8 have already reshaped the political reality of the South Caucasus. Within this new framework, the task before Armenia is clear: To restore balance, not through submission, but through strategic reciprocity.
Ruben Harutyunyan