by Philippe Raffi Kalfayan
Since 2018, the internal political life of the Republic of Armenia has been marked by ever-increasing polarization. Initially, it could have been described as a witch hunt against the former ruling forces but it ultimately appears to be a specific plan of action that seeks global objectives. It is designed to consolidate Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s new, highly personal “ideology”: the Armenian nation is limited to those living within the borders of the Republic of Armenia; the existence of an independent Nagorno-Karabakh represented a threat to Armenia’s territorial integrity; the diaspora is not a component of “real Armenia”; peace with our neighbors requires wiping the slate of past crimes clean.
For the past few months, the political landscape has been shaken by a new attempt to divide society: an all-out attack against the church and its leader. There is long-standing animosity between prime minister and Catholicos of All Armenians Karekin II (dating back to at least 2020), but it has taken an aggressive turn at a time when the government is trying to silence opponents and to find excuses to detain the representatives of political or institutional forces that challenge its policy of capitulation and surrender to an increasingly demanding Azerbaijan. Opponents of this policy are accused of harming national security by representing a threat to the supposedly established “peace” with Azerbaijan, which is clearly still awaiting a final agreement.
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It is worth recalling that since August 2018, the government of the Republic of Armenia has been systematically eliminating all constitutional checks and balances. While the ruling party legitimately holds more than two-thirds of the seats in the parliament, there is no longer any democratic debate because no committee chairmanships are reserved for the opposition blocs. All debates or draft resolutions proposed by the opposition in Parliament are either rejected by the Parliament’s Bureau or are doomed to failure if they challenge the prime minister’s program and “vision.”
Outside Parliament, the prime minister has reshaped the judiciary to fit his plan of action. He has dismissed all judges, whether from the judiciary or the Constitutional Court, who do not share his policies or do not comply with his instructions. In short, an independent judiciary no longer exists.
Similarly, he has dismissed all high-ranking officials who serve in legal affairs, intelligence services, national security, the army and the police who oppose him.
This is the context leading up to his attack on the Armenian Apostolic Church, a symbol and pillar of the nation and the preservation of its cultural identity. This institution, beyond its spiritual role, enabled the Armenian nation to survive for six centuries without a state. To weaken the church’s mission, attacks are being launched against priests resisting capitulation and/or abandonment of national values and features on the account of the new ideology.
Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan was the first one to quit his clerical mission to lead a mass movement of resistance seeking the resignation of the prime minister. His diocese, Tavush, sits on the Azerbaijani border and has already lost many square kilometers to Azerbaijani incursions. The attack on another cleric, Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan, specifically his pre-trial detention, is officially explained by an alleged phone conversation during which the authorities claim he called for an overthrow of the government. The real motive is that Ajapahyan has called for resisting the changes that the government wants to introduce in draft laws affecting the relationship between the state and the church, particularly regarding the State Public Educational Standards. This draft has been under public discussion since June 25, and the response of the working group was submitted to the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport on July 10. The Working Group noted in an announcement that the proposed draft laws removed the concepts of “Nation,” “Fatherland,” “Armenianness,” “Christianity” from the education standards. In addition, the group said the role of the Armenian language in the protection of Armenianness is ignored. As well, members objected to the removal of any mention of the diaspora. As the statement says: “There is an impression that the Project does not refer to the nation which has two thousand years of history and an identity with Christian mission of the National Church.”
Therefore, the motives of the attack against the high-ranking clergymen are less for unsubstantiated allegations of staging a coup than their opposition to the anti-national standards that the government is trying to impose.
To achieve this end, the administration has chosen an undignified path. The personal attacks aimed at replacing the head of the church and his deputies by the prime minister’s men are exceptionally violent and extremely vulgar, unworthy of a head of state.
Further, all prominent figures in civil society who support the church in this confrontation are also being targeted and held in pretrial detention without any serious grounds for charges (see Samvel Karapetyan’s case).
All these maneuvers are aimed at securing the prime minister’s re-election in June 2026, allowing him to complete his agenda. During his visit to Paris ten days ago, he asserted that he would win these elections. The die is cast! The creation of a new, heavily equipped elite force within the police, a veritable “praetorian guard,” will undoubtedly ensure that this is indeed the case.
Constitution and the Church
Within this context, let us try to examine the issues driving this conflict dispassionately in light of the Constitution and the law concerning church-state relations, the participation of clergy members in political life, and some ad hominem attacks against the head of the Armenian Church.
The two fundamental provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia (2015) — a text examined and approved by the Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe, before its adoption by referendum — are as follows:
Article 17. The State and Religious Organizations
- The freedom of activities of religious organizations shall be guaranteed in the Republic of Armenia.
- Religious organizations shall be separate from the State.
Article 18. The Armenian Apostolic Holy Church
- The Republic of Armenia shall recognize the exclusive mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church, as a national church, in the spiritual life of the Armenian people, in the development of their national culture and preservation of their national identity.
- The relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church may be regulated by law.
The first article enshrines the separation of church and state and the church’s freedom of activity. It guarantees, in particular, the church’s autonomy in matters of doctrine, governance, and the election of its supreme head, the Catholicos of All Armenians. The second article implicitly recognizes the Armenian Church’s special mission to the entire nation, both in Armenia and in the diaspora.
The law regulating the relations between the church and the Republic of Armenia (paradoxically predating the 1995 Constitution, amended in 2005 and 2015) has been adopted by the Supreme Council in 1991. That is the “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations of the Republic of Armenia.” Several bills have been proposed to amend or replace it, particularly between 2009 and 2017. The last bill received joint opinions from the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, but it will never be put to a vote in the National Assembly.
The applicable law therefore remains that of 1991. As to relations between Religious Organizations and the State, it specifies:
Section 17
In the Republic of Armenia, Church and State are separate. On the basis of this separation the State:
- a) Shall not force a citizen to adhere to any religion.
- b) Shall not interfere in the activities and internal affairs of church and Religious Organizations as long as they operate in accordance with the law, no state agency or person acting on behalf of such agency shall operate within a Religious Organization.
- c) Prohibits the participation of the Church in governing the State and shall not impose any governmental functions on the Church or Religious Organization.
The State shall not obstruct the efforts of the Armenian Church in pursuing the following activities which we expressly reserved to be her privilege solely:
(…)
At the same time, the Armenian Apostolic Church as the national Church of Armenians, which also operates outside the Republic, shall enjoy the protection of the Republic of Armenia, within the framework of international legal norms.
Section 18
The State shall finance neither the activity of Religious Organizations nor of atheistic propaganda. At the same time, the state guarantees the right of the members or employees of Religious Organizations to take part in the civil and political life on an equal basis with other citizens.
Absent an opinion of the Constitutional Court, Armenia’s Public Council held a consultation on June 12, 2025, and declared that “ (…) emphasizing the importance of preserving public solidarity, mutual respect, and tolerance, it sees the resolution of the current situation exclusively within the legal framework, guided by the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, the Law on Relations Between the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church, and the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations.”
“Accordingly, the Church and clergy must maintain political neutrality, and the state, in turn, must refrain from interfering in the Church’s internal procedures.” However, there exists no “Law on Relations Between the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church”. Absent the independence of this institution, this interpretation is null and void. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court, if consulted, would not be independent either.
Therefore, any attempt to subject the Church to state control or any state interference in the internal affairs of the Church violates the constitutional guarantees of the Republic of Armenia (Articles 17 and 18 of the Constitution and of the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations).
It also violates the European Convention. In a landmark case, Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and others v. Bulgaria (2009), the Court held that the State, by intervening to determine which group of believers and clergy should be considered the legal representative of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, had breached its duty of neutrality and impartiality. By recognizing one leader and rejecting the other, the State had arbitrarily interfered in the internal affairs of the Church, thereby violating the religious group’s autonomy to choose its own leaders. The Court found a violation of Article 9 (Freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the Convention. The case was concerning a schismatic crisis within the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The Bulgarian state authorities had recognized and supported the faction led by Patriarch Maxim, to the detriment of the other faction led by Metropolitan Inokentiy (the applicant). In particular, the government had legalized the statutes of Patriarch Maxim’s faction and refused to recognize Metropolitan Inokentiy’s leadership.
The Constitution also provides for the participation of members of the clergy in political life, on an equal footing with any other citizen, all within the bounds of the law.
What Are the Limits of Clergy Participation in Political Life?
The government is well aware of these constitutional provisions. This is precisely why the reason put forward for arresting priests rests on the allegation that their public or private statements (recorded through illegal wiretaps) aim to overthrow the government by illicit means. To date, no serious evidence has emerged to support this claim. It would seem, rather, that the statements in question are the product of casual conversations, like those that occur in every family and group in Armenia and the Diaspora, about the ever more concerning policies of Nikol Pashinyan.
I recently corresponded with the author of an opinion piece published by Armenpress (the official voice of the government). His personal point trying to oppose power and legitimacy is biased since it completely ignores the absence of rule of law and the government’s anti-national strategy. He acknowledged in our conversation that the Constitution is being violated. However, he maintained that the Church should not stray from its spiritual mission. This is our only point of disagreement. because why shouldn’t the Armenian Church, guarantor of the existence and protection of this nation and its cultural identity, or the clergy members, in their personal capacity, be able to participate in the political debate by expressing their views on the current alarming situation?
Let’s take two examples of high-ranking priests who participated in political and social life in France. French Archbishop Ricard participated in the demonstrations against same-sex marriage in 2013, when he was Archbishop of Bordeaux. He notably marched in his cassock. While this bishop was later condemned by canon law (of the Church) in 2022, it was for sexual assault committed against a minor, not for this opinion against the draft law on same sex marriage. An older case concerns Bishop Gaillot. He was dismissed from his position as Bishop of Evreux by Pope John Paul II in 1995 due to his highly publicized stances in favor of homosexuals, divorced and remarried Catholics, the ordination of married men, and in opposition to certain decisions of the French Bishops’ Conference. After 20 years of exclusion, and at the request of Pope Francis, Bishop Gaillot was received informally at the Vatican in 2015. During this meeting, he again defended the cause of divorced and homosexual Catholics, and the Pope listened attentively. His reception was widely interpreted as a symbolic and personal gesture of rehabilitation on the part of Pope Francis.
Two observations emerge from these two cases: participation in political debate on social issues is authorized by both the French Constitution and the Church; statements by high-ranking priests on societal issues are not prohibited by canon law, but they must conform to current Church doctrine. The case of Bishop Gaillot demonstrates that this doctrine is not immutable and can be conciliatory.
Furthermore, the accusation of violating the vow of chastity and priestly celibacy should be examined in light of the differences in ecclesiastical discipline between the Latin Church and the Eastern Churches, as well as the Church’s hypocrisies, since far more serious violations are committed by members of the Catholic clergy, for example.
Alleged Breaches of Vows of Celibacy and Chastity
Personally, I will not presume to take a position on such a sensitive subject, especially since I do not belong to the community of the faithful, nor am I familiar with the details of all the grievances against Armenian priests. Whether true or not, it does not matter; their private affairs or transgressions should receive ecclesiastical discipline where necessary, and not be dealt with in a court of public opinion.
According to canonical rules, in the Armenian Apostolic Church, as in the Latin Catholic Church, the vow of celibacy is associated with the vow of chastity for ordained priests. During the Soviet era, the Communist Party and the KGB encouraged clergymen to “enjoy life” and break their vows of chastity, which eventually could provide them with a pretext to remove them from their positions if they broke their allegiance to the Communist Party.
Priestly celibacy is an ecclesiastical discipline, not a dogma of faith. It was gradually imposed over the centuries for reasons that are theological, eschatological (celibacy is considered a prophetic sign of the coming Kingdom of God), ascetic (priestly purity), and economic (preventing the ecclesiastical property and benefits associated with the mission of a married priest or one living in concubinage from being passed on to their children, thus threatening the wealth and financial independence of the Church).
In the early days of the church, and during the first millennium in the West, many priests and bishops were married, but the requirement was continence (an end to marital relations) after ordination, not celibacy before ordination. The Eastern Catholic Churches and the Orthodox Church still permit, and this is a consistent tradition, the ordination of married men (they cannot, however, marry after ordination, and bishops are chosen preferably from among celibate men). It is worth noting here that Yeghishe Derdérian, a priest from Jerusalem, became Patriarch of the Armenian Church of Jerusalem (from 1960 to 1990), despite having a registered child. His election was governed by the bylaws of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, which are independent of those of the Holy See of Echmiadzin.
Regarding unmarried priests with children, in the Latin Catholic Church this situation is considered a violation of the obligation of perfect and perpetual continence and priestly celibacy. According to canon law, the child’s well-being takes precedence: the priest is obligated to assume the consequences of his fatherhood, including acknowledging the child and taking responsibility for its upbringing. In this case, the Church generally requests that the priest be relieved of his clerical duties and his ministry to allow him to fully assume his fatherhood (understood if the child is a minor and in need of protection).
Adopting a moral stance on celibacy and chastity for ecclesiastical authorities is not within the purview of the State. It is a matter of doctrine and discipline internal to the Church.
After the revelation of the pedophilia scandal and the crimes against humanity committed against Indigenous children, taken from their families and forcibly interned in residential schools to “de-indigenize” them through abuse and mistreatment, wouldn’t it be appropriate for Churches to consider reforming their practices regarding celibacy and chastity?
In conclusion, a priest’s private life is a matter for the individual, his conscience, and his transparency in relation to the ecclesiastical discipline of his Church. Under no circumstances does the government have the constitutional right to interfere in this matter. Moreover, the Prime Minister has not been mistaken and has changed his strategy. The attack is now being waged in the name of the “faithful” and the sacred values of the Church, and not in the name of the people. He is changing his tune to justify his intervention in Church affairs and against its leaders. In reality, this changes very little: the faithful are citizens like everyone else. They have no more rights than anyone else.
During the debates preceding the adoption of the latest Constitution in 2015, many voices challenged the provisions aimed at strengthening the personal powers of the Head of Government, but no one ever questioned the principles governing the relationship between Church and State.