Pashinyan’s statement about the possibility of snap elections has raised questions about whether he has a chance of securing a bigger victory than he did on June 7, if he intends to call snap elections should he fail to secure the opposition’s support on the Constitution issue.
But even if Pashinyan has no such chance, what is his alternative? The alternative is not to hold a constitutional referendum and, consequently, not to meet Azerbaijan’s demand. Yet the big question is which option poses a greater risk to the architecture of Nikol Pashinyan’s power: calling snap elections or failing to meet Azerbaijan’s demand. In any case, the risk of the first option is probably no greater than that of the second. And the issue is not that Azerbaijan might attack Armenia or escalate tensions if its demand is not met. Nikol Pashinyan presumably knows well that such risks from Azerbaijan are more likely to depend on how various factors in the geopolitical environment align. Moreover, the peace agreement does not by any means resolve all outstanding issues in the Armenian-Azerbaijani process, meaning that Baku can always find a “loophole.”
The point is that if Pashinyan fails to meet the demand, the fact that the peace agreement remains unsigned undermines the construct he has presented to his electorate, at the heart of which lie peace itself and the agreement as its “finale” or backbone. Consequently, failing to meet Azerbaijan’s demand breaks the backbone of Nikol Pashinyan’s power structure. This is no less of a risk than calling snap elections. All the more so because the electoral process would give Pashinyan at least some room to maneuver in terms of timing—a resource he badly needs.
Hakob BADALYAN
