Three factors that have significantly softened the Armenian authorities’ anti-Russian rhetoric
Have you noticed that the Pashinyan regime’s mouthpieces have largely stopped sounding the alarm about “hybrid warfare” and “Russian agents”? These issues have not disappeared entirely from public discourse, but they have been relegated to the back burner. The rhetoric has subsided not only among Civil Contract members and Nikol Pashinyan’s bureaucrats, but also among NGOs funded by Western grants — the very organizations that once detected “hybrid agents” under every bush. (Incidentally, this shows that while the money does indeed come from the West, the ideas being promoted come from the Armenian government.)
Let me remind you that, before the elections, the authorities secured €12 million from the EU to “counter hybrid threats”* — in other words, to protect Armenia from Russia. I suspect the money was duly spent, essentially on the government’s election campaign. And, to be fair, the threat of the “Russian boot” proved almost as effective as the profound argument that “if we are not in power, war will break out.”
Now there is no news of “Russian agents.” Either they have all been caught, or they have decided to abandon their misguided ways and fully appreciate the charms of living in the “Fourth Republic” and “Real Armenia.”
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The issue, of course, is not whether these agents have been “caught” or “repented.” The point is that Pashinyan could not care less about the EU, European values or Armenia’s integration with the West. The only thing that concerns him is holding on to his seat. And for this “sacred” purpose, he is prepared to voice diametrically opposite views — and, accordingly, instruct his propagandists to do the same — over the course of years, months or even weeks. He has done so repeatedly on the Artsakh issue, for example. If necessary, he would join the Russia-Belarus Union State without batting an eyelid and would justify that decision just as “convincingly” at his press briefings: “Yes, our views on these matters have changed somewhat.”
What determines these “slight changes,” naturally, is a shift in the political climate. And that climate really is changing. Three interrelated factors are at play here.
The first is that European and American institutions can no longer turn a blind eye to the manifestations of deepening authoritarianism — in particular, political repression, rigged elections and persecution of the Church. The latest debate and resolution in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) were the first swallows heralding a change. The comparison with Saudi Arabia does not hold up in this case: no Saudi prince claims that his country is a bastion of democracy.
The second factor is that major domestic political developments are unfolding in the United States and Europe, and these cannot help but affect relations with Armenia. Take France, for example: Macron will no longer be president when his second term ends. Whoever succeeds him will, of course, maintain France’s traditionally friendly relations with Armenia, but is unlikely to turn a blind eye to an enfant terrible like Pashinyan. It is also important that France’s next president will not be the godfather of the decision to recognize Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan.
The third factor is even more important. There are signs that a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine may be agreed either later this year or next year. If that happens, Europeans will no longer need the Armenian authorities’ “anti-hybrid” fairy tales.
Russia, however, is another matter. It operates through the crude, imperialist methods characteristic of the country, resorting to blunt and unabashed blackmail. (Putin’s “protocol-friendly” smiles and pats on the shoulder do not count.) Such blackmail — for example, over gas supplies — could have dangerous consequences for Pashinyan’s hold on power. It is therefore predictable that he will return to Russia’s orbit, which is far more congenial to him in every respect.
Aram ABRAHAMYAN
Aravot Daily
27.10.2026
