New “surprises” by the “Eurasian three” are not worth excluding
On May 29, the motives of the well-known story at the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council panel session held in Kazakhstan related to Armenian’s accession to the Eurasian Union with Nagorno-Karabakh were revealed just few days ago. The RF Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukaev clearly stated in Baku that Azerbaijan may consider the issue of participating in integration processes within the Eurasian Economic Community, moreover, he stated that they have invited Azerbaijan to the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union. “All forms of integration are open and subject for discussion. Azerbaijan’s integration into the Customs Union or the Eurasian Economic Union is a subject of a specific discussion, as well as the other forms of integration…”
Official Baku, most likely, has put forward requirements before the Eurasian trio, and in the event of entering them to force, it will starting getting into “trade” as to under what terms Azerbaijan can constitute a part of that structure. Azerbaijan is an “attractive” country for the Eurasian trio, while from the perspective of Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical aspirations, the establishment of Eurasian integration is a vital question. People criticizing Serzh Sargsyan’s silence in Astana should also be interested a bit in Armenia’s strategic ally, Russian President’s silence. Although it is difficult for the leader of a country selling four or five billion dollars of weapons to Azerbaijan over three years to imagine what reversal can be heard on the occasion of improper behavior by the president of Kazakhstan in response to a letter sent by Ilham Aliyev.
Serzh Sargsyan’s subsequent response already before the participants of the regular gathering of RPA youth organization, “and who has said that we will be joining the Customs Union with Karabakh”, was surprising, at least in the sense that Serzh Sargsyan’s well-know decision made on September 3 regarding accession to the Customs Union was justified by the ruling circles, by linking this decision with Nagorno-Karabakh and even the security of Armenia, considering it necessary and a vital issue for Armenians.
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Now, the authorities of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are announcing, Nagorno-Karabakh issue cannot be resolved in the Customs Union”, “Karabakh, according to our legislation, does not constitute a part of Armenia now”. No one, seems, had not even declared that not the OSCE Minsk Group, but “Eurasian”, a new and different format, will be handling the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Those who are trying today to remind that “Artsakh is an independent state”, should almost equal their efforts to the point that incurs that the purpose of the plot organized by the Azerbaijani president in Astana was to prove Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. The topic of subject in question is distorted here. What? Has Ilham Aliyev sent a letter to Eurasian trio to fix in Astana that Nagorno-Karabakh is an independent country?… It is clear for all that touching the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh in Astana has been an attempt to hit the Armenian diplomacy, and it was successful because the Armenian authorities were not prepared for this “attack”, whereas such a development was completely unexpected, since both the President of Kazakhstan and the Belarus President, prior to Astana, had hinted on the “complexities” of Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian integration process . Therefore, it is surprising that the president of Kazakhstan’s behavior was unexpected to our authorities.
Now it is more important how the authorities of Armenia, the Armenian political and social platform, will overcome the Astana “incident”. The authorities made some steps to emphasize the significance of Nagorno-Karabakh. On May 31, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, Foreign Ministry’s central administration staff, and the leaders of diplomatic representations of Armenia visited Stepanakert. Later, on June 2, at the Sports and Concert Complex named after Karen Demirchyan, Serge Sargsyan met with Foreign Ministry’s senior staff and the leaders of RA diplomatic representations overseas, and spoke on key issues of foreign policy, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the same meeting, the Foreign Minister of Karabakh, Karen Mirzoyan, introduces the priority direction of the NKR foreign policy.
But, all this is not enough. Making the appropriateness of Armenia’s membership in Eurasian integration process a subject of serious discussion, and as a result making Armenia’s voice more audible should be number one issue on social and political agenda. The RA authorities must be prepared to new “surprises” by the “Eurasian trio”, and they should not be considered unexpected, because the “Eurasian trio”, unfortunately, does not consider the Republic of Armenia an influential partner-state.
As for the opposition political and social circles, and then not missing the next opportunity of fixing Astana as a “diplomatic failure” by RA authorities was as much expected as evading the topic of trying to degrade Armenia by its “strategic ally” Putin’s silence. Counting the “diplomatic failures” is more “inoffensive” task, than, for example, raising the issue of consistently equipping Azerbaijan by Russia, one of the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries, and specific risks intimidating the security of Armenia and Karabakh.
And finally. Do Armenia’s “non-government” forces of the parliament have a position other than the policy currently implemented by Serzh Sargsyan with regard to Armenia’s path with “Eurasian”?… With regard to Armenia’s accession to the CU, it seems a specific “consensus, plus Serzh Sargsyan” formula is operating between the government and “non-government” forces.
EMMA GABRIELYAN
