Our government has a certain contradiction in its relationship with Russia.
I completely agree with the notion that Pashinyan is not undesirable for Russia. In fact, I would go further: he is quite desirable—not just for Russia, but also for all of Armenia’s neighbors and other regional stakeholders. There is a kind of advantage in preferring a “player” who, in reality, doesn’t play—who constantly chooses to “pass” and merely performs formal functions. Even better, if that player is driven by inflated personal ambition and unwarranted self-confidence, experienced geopolitical actors find it much easier to maneuver around him.
So yes, Pashinyan does not pose any obstacle to Russia’s interests. But if that’s the case, then what is the basis for these recurring claims that Russia is waging a hybrid war against Armenia? After all, war—hybrid or not—is waged against an adversary state, with the goal of altering its political course or leadership. (Perhaps some opposition forces in Armenia dream of such a scenario, but that is their issue.)
If Armenia’s current leadership is not undesirable—if its political course (not to be confused with the rhetoric of “sister parties” or grant-funded NGOs) is largely favorable to Moscow—then why would the Kremlin want a war, hybrid or otherwise?
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As things stand now, I suspect the Kremlin would have no objection at all to Pashinyan’s re-election or continuation in office in 2026.
And what does this so-called “hybrid war” even consist of? That a journalist or commentator criticizes the government? Is that what constitutes hybrid warfare now?
It seems to me that this narrative—this conspiratorial mythology in which even a brawl in the Nor Nork district administration is allegedly orchestrated by the Kremlin—is designed for domestic consumption. Its purpose? To frame the current government as heroically “defending Armenia’s sovereignty.”
And yes, there are people who genuinely believe it.
Aram ABRAHAMYAN
