The most discussed topic in Armenia over the past week was, of course, the Pashinyan–Putin meeting in Bishkek. One of the most widely discussed episodes was a video recorded immediately afterward in a government vehicle, in which Nikol Pashinyan said that he had had a very good meeting with the Russian president. Many people are skeptical, puzzled, and even mocking the statement.
The whole point is that what is publicly measured as “good” is one thing, while what is “good” by Pashinyan’s standards is something else entirely. What is good for Pashinyan is by no means necessarily good for the public. Is that bad? Of course. But that is the reality.
When Nikol Pashinyan says he had a good meeting with Putin, the public measures it by whether the problems related to goods have been resolved. But that is the wrong yardstick. Nikol Pashinyan is not interested in those issues. More than that, he has long since turned Armenia’s economy into small change for his political wager.
For Nikol Pashinyan, what matters is that Russia continues to “raise” his — Pashinyan’s — “price” in the eyes of the West, particularly the European Union. Why would Russia “raise Pashinyan’s price” if Pashinyan is cutting Armenia off from Russia and taking it toward the EU?
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Meanwhile, it is the EU that Nikol Pashinyan is “bringing” to Armenia — and only temporarily, filling, under the “responsibility” of the EU, the gaps that have emerged in Armenia’s security architecture as Russia’s capabilities and role have diminished. And in order to prevent those gaps from being used to turn the Caucasus into a second front against Russia, Moscow needs to fill them with something.
Filling them with Turkey alone would also entail major risks: later, it would be very difficult to reverse the situation. Filling them instead with the EU, which has no common border with Armenia, is far more advantageous, because once its strength is restored, it will be much easier to “get rid” of the EU.
The problem for Moscow is simply how to keep this rather complicated maneuver under control. And to solve that problem, Pashinyan needs to have not only needs but also arguments when dealing with the EU. In Bishkek, Pashinyan acquired a fresh stockpile of such arguments.
Hakob BADALYAN
