Realpolitik Put to the Test in Armenia
On 26 September 2022, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta published my article “Armenia’s ‘Machiavellian Moment’”. I borrowed the concept of the “Machiavellian moment” from historian John Pocock’s book of the same name, published in the United States in 1975. It describes a situation in which, amid changing historical and political circumstances, threats to a republic’s existence make it imperative to reconsider its institutions and values. Many nations have faced this challenge: safeguarding their country’s security has required them to rethink entrenched approaches and make decisions that run counter to traditional beliefs and historical understandings.
Five centuries before John Pocock, Niccolò Machiavelli posed the question of how to preserve the political order when the steps necessary to do so conflict with accepted norms and beliefs. Addressing the same problem, Ludwig von Rochau introduced the term Realpolitik in 1853. Analysing the domestic political experience of the German states, he showed that the justice of a demand alone is not enough to bring about change: the power and means to implement it are also necessary. Taking account of the government’s superior coercive power does not mean condoning its arbitrary exercise of authority. Yet condemnation alone is not enough to change the situation.
Political power is certainly not confined to control over the levers and resources of the state, and changing circumstances can also give the weaker side new sources of leverage. Such an opportunity arises when the ruling political force cannot secure a legal decision of paramount importance to it without the opposition’s support. At that point, what matters is not only the imbalance of power, but also each side’s priorities and what it is prepared to do to secure the other’s support.
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Viewed from this perspective, Armenia’s current domestic political confrontation raises a question: can an agreement with a government that needs the opposition’s support to amend the Constitution link efforts to address the country’s security challenges with the implementation of domestic reforms? This question has direct practical relevance. Safeguarding national security and establishing a state governed by the rule of law require difficult decisions. The confrontation between the government and the opposition must, therefore, be considered primarily in terms of these two objectives.
As long as the government needs the opposition’s support to pursue its policies, the opposition can make that support conditional on urgent domestic reforms. Negotiations would then cover not only constitutional changes imposed through external coercion, but also, for example, guarantees of judicial independence, government accountability, and limits on the arbitrary exercise of power.
Even institutional changes imposed from outside could thus incorporate effective mechanisms for strengthening the rule of law.
Such an approach would require more of the opposition than justified criticism of the government. Having gained a new source of leverage, the opposition must clearly define the changes it seeks, how it proposes to implement them, and the terms on which it is prepared to assume its share of responsibility for difficult decisions of existential importance to the country.
What matters most here is the substance of the political bargain and the guarantees that commitments will be honoured. Supporting a strategic government decision may be justified if it opens the way to comprehensive domestic reforms and ensures that their results endure. But compromise loses its purpose when the weaker side provides its support immediately, while the timetable for the other side to fulfil its commitments remains uncertain. Which steps must be taken while the parties still need each other’s support, and what will ensure that the remaining commitments are fulfilled later? Without clear guarantees, the weaker side risks receiving nothing more than promises in return for tangible support.
Thus, despite all the difficulties involved, the imperative to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia may offer an opportunity to strengthen both national security and the rule of law. Yet strengthening security requires more than domestic political agreement: it also requires deeper mutual understanding between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the development of mutual trust grounded in reciprocal commitments and guarantees of their fulfilment. The government of the Republic of Armenia should, therefore, make its consent to constitutional changes conditional on Azerbaijan undertaking and fulfilling the following commitments:
- Finality of the precondition: a public and explicitly documented commitment by Baku that, once the agreed constitutional amendment has been adopted, no new preconditions will be imposed for signing the peace agreement.
- Withdrawal of Azerbaijani armed forces from the occupied territories of Armenia: a clear withdrawal timetable and an international mechanism to verify compliance.
- Delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian–Azerbaijani border in accordance with internationally recognised norms and practices.
The parties’ agreements must set clear deadlines for fulfilling their commitments and provide effective guarantees. Influential international actors that advocate long-term peace in the South Caucasus have a particular role to play: their support should help secure mutually acceptable solutions and ensure their consistent implementation.
The realism and responsibility of Armenia’s leading political forces will be measured by their ability, within existing constraints, to strengthen national security, the rule of law, and the foundations of lasting peace. Continuing a policy driven by narrow group interests will only serve external powers, undermining Armenia’s independence and the sovereignty of its people.
Armen Martirosyan
Member of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia (1990–1999)
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Armenia
Aravot daily
11.11.2026
