Jurisdictions associated with TRIPP limit sovereignty to the land property
Mirror Spectator. It should be noted that the June 2026 Agreement provides for two categories of projects within the strip of land conceded. “TRIPP projects” concern transport and flow infrastructure: rail, road, oil and gas pipelines, fiber optics and electricity. But Article 6 of the Agreement also provides for “non-TRIPP projects”, which any legal entity, individual or corporate (company or State), can propose. These are “Special Purpose Vehicles” (SPVs). The SPVs will be subsidiaries of TDC for the purpose of implementing a specific TRIPP modality. This article exposes Armenia to several risks: any third-party state, directly or more likely indirectly, could develop and finance projects dangerous for Armenia’s neighbors or for environmental protection through private companies.
Even if Armenia were to oppose it, its share in the TRIPP company does not give it the ability to block the project in case of disagreement. For example, will the American partner, influenced by its regional ally Israel, allow Armenia to build the Iran-Armenia railway? In the context of the current war between the US/Israel and Iran — recalling that the Abraham Accords are managed by the very people who designed the TRIPP agreement — we can reasonably doubt it.
An example corroborates this doubt. The Board of Peace established primarily to cease the war and to reconstruct Gaza, fails to impose an end to Israeli aggressions on Gaza. The first decision of this Council does not concern the reconstruction of Gaza — housing, hospitals, schools, water or electricity networks — but rather focuses on the construction of a military base intended to host 150 Moroccan soldiers of the international force.
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The legal and institutional design of the TRIPP Framework Agreement fundamentally transforms the landscape of Armenia’s sovereign governance. Although presented as a transit corridor promoting peace, its functional architecture introduces deep structural asymmetries from a jurisdictional and economic standpoint. Let us look more closely at several aspects of this agreement.
Legal concessions
The Framework Agreement is dependent on two other contractual documents that are not yet public: the Shareholders’ Agreement (the shareholders of the TRIPP Development Company—TDC—are TDC US and the Armenian State) and the TDC Charter.
The Shareholders’ Agreement is a private American commercial contract governed by US law, specifically that of the State of New York. Its purpose is to govern certain rights and obligations of TDC’s shareholders, as well as matters relating to the management of TDC. TDC grants a 74% majority stake to an American entity (TDC-US) registered as a subsidiary of the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), an American federal agency headquartered in Delaware, a US tax haven.
Only the TDC Charter will be governed by Armenian law. This Charter will notably manage rights relating to the TRIPP Implementation Area, meaning the strip of territory conceded to the TDC company for 49 years, namely exclusive rights of development, land use and exploitation. This concession could be extended up to 99 years. As a reminder, the Armenian State holds only 26% of the shares in this company.
Despite all the rhetorical assurances of the Armenian government, there is a loss of control over legal sovereignty. Article 5(3) stipulates that the Framework Agreement prevails over Armenian domestic law in the event of a conflict. This primacy assumes that the Framework Agreement is elevated to the rank of an international treaty ratified by both Armenia and the US Congress for it to be constitutional. Private law disputes relating to companies involved in the project are submitted to the law of the State of New York.
The Armenian National Assembly ratified the TRIPP framework agreement. Furthermore, the Armenian government convened an extraordinary parliamentary session to adopt the necessary amendments to the Law on Joint-Stock Companies, the Civil Code, and regulations relating to public-private partnerships, specifically to allow the formal registration and legal establishment of the entity (Article 3.6 of the Framework Agreement). These legislative amendments bypass existing Armenian legislation and grant privileges to investors and companies involved in TRIPP projects. The modifications will be included in the Shareholders’ Agreement and the TDC Charter.
The United States Congress has not ratified the agreement. Furthermore, the TDC joint-stock company itself is still in the process of being created and is not operational.
Economic and Financial Concessions
Economic and financial concessions are numerous, and their sum raises questions regarding benefits for Armenia.
Armenia agrees (Article 4.3 of the Framework Agreement) that TDC is authorized to select third parties to assist in each TRIPP project implemented by the ad hoc companies (SPVs), including third parties acting as concessionaires, developers, operators, contractors or EPC (engineering, procurement, and construction) providers for such a TRIPP project.
TRIPP offers very few tax resources, so extensive is the list of exemptions.
Article 9 includes the following concessions:
- TDC US (i.e., 74% of TDC’s revenues) will be exempt from all taxes. (9.1)
- Dividends paid to TDC by subcontractors (SPVs) will also be non-taxable. (9.2)
- Capital gains and transfers of shares of TDC and its subsidiaries (SPVs) will be exempt from any taxation. (9.3)
- Finally, TDC and its subsidiaries will pay no tax on the transfer or assignment of conceded rights, whether from the Armenian government to TDC or from TDC to its subsidiaries. (9.4)
Off-budget financial vehicles — such as the $402 million “TRIPP+ Trans-Caspian Enterprise Fund” backed by the United States — completely bypass state accounts to target investments in private enterprises in the region.
TRIPP functions more like an “offshore” concession zone than a source of tax revenue. This absence of fiscal and financial benefits reveals not only a loss of economic sovereignty, but calls into question Armenia’s interest in this project.
In conclusion, we observe a totally asymmetrical agreement with a loss of jurisdictional and fiscal sovereignty over the activities and investments that will be operated in the conceded territory strip. Azerbaijan considers that freight transiting between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan must not be subject to the same transit fees as freight originating from other entities. However, control at the checkpoints will be subcontracted to a private operator.
This unbalanced agreement adds to the threats of commercial sanctions from both the Russia/EEU bloc (due to the rapprochement with the European Union) and the United States (due to trade with Iran) despite the desire to diversify export markets; and to an already high public debt for a country exposed to structural imbalances economically and socially. These Armenian-American agreements — whose durability is unknown and whose legal design and the men who conceived them threaten to transform the TRIPP El Dorado into long-term systemic dependency and a manifest loss of sovereignty that goes unmentioned. It may be difficult to erase the Agreement if it becomes an international treaty.
Philippe Raffi Kalfayan
(Philippe Raffi Kalfayan, based in Paris, is a lawyer, lecturer in international law and a former secretary general of FIDH (International Federation of Human Rights), who has earned a Ph.D. in international law. He is a regular columnist for the Armenian Mirror-Spectator.)
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