Geghard foundation: The Parliament of Kosovo adopted the declaration of independence on February 17, 2008. The following day, Turkey welcomed the adoption of the declaration and decided to officially recognize the independence of the Republic of Kosovo. Moreover, Turkey became one of the guarantors of Kosovo’s security. Ankara is Pristina’s key military partner and the main supplier of armaments. Turkish forces are largely involved in ensuring territorial and public security in Kosovo. Turkey undoubtedly has its own interests regarding Kosovo. For its part, Kosovo views Turkey as a supporter—not only in terms of ensuring security and aligning its armed forces with NATO standards, but also for achieving international recognition of its independence.
However, Azerbaijan does not share Turkey’s approach on this issue. On February 18, 2008, the day Turkey recognized Kosovo’s independence, Azerbaijan announced that it would not recognize the independence of Kosovo. The spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the resolution adopted by Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government on secession from Serbia contradicted international law. During the hearings held in 2009 at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which examined the legality of the unilateral declaration of independence, Baku reaffirmed its position. According to the Azerbaijani side, a region that declares secession in violation of domestic laws cannot be considered a state.
Contradictions in the approaches of Azerbaijan and Turkey are not limited to the issue of Kosovo’s independence. The disagreements between these two “brotherly” states also concern to the normalization process with Armenia, the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, relations with Israel, the Kurdish question, and other issues. However, Ankara and Baku manage to coordinate their policies on normalization of relations with Armenia. Turkey, for instance—under pressure from Baku—conditions the normalization of relations with Armenia on the progress of the Armenia–Azerbaijan process. At the same time, the tensions between Israel, Azerbaijan’s close partner and a supporter of Kurdish statehood, and Turkey, which opposes it, do not hinder their economic cooperation. As for Northern Cyprus, Baku does not explicitly rule out the possibility of recognizing its independence. In this context, Kosovo is particularly noteworthy, as Azerbaijan continues to insist that it will never recognize its independence. Moreover, it provides diplomatic support to the other party to the conflict, Serbia, on the issue of restoring its territorial integrity, earning appreciation from the Serbian side.
Azerbaijan has framed its policy on Kosovo from the outset in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Throughout debates over Kosovo’s status, Baku has consistently sought to prevent the emergence of a “precedent.” As early as 2007, the Azerbaijani government urged the European Union (EU) to reject proposals to grant Kosovo independence. It warned that such a secession in the Balkans could create a precedent for Nagorno-Karabakh.
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During these discussions, the representative of Azerbaijan stated that although the Kosovo issue differs from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, resolving a territorial dispute in violation of international law—by favoring secession and independence—could have negative repercussions for the Caucasus region. The Azerbaijani official supplemented the appeal to the European Union (EU) with an element of interest, offering support to European countries in diversifying their energy markets and reducing dependence on Russian gas and oil. In response to this “attractive” proposal, European officials acknowledged Nagorno-Karabakh as an “occupied territory” and assured Baku that the Kosovo precedent would not be used to the detriment of conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
However, assurances from European countries and Turkey’s approach to Kosovo did not, in fact, alleviate Baku’s concerns. Azerbaijan continued to pursue a policy on this Balkan conflict that diverged from that of Turkey and its Western partners. In line with its political stance on Kosovo’s independence, Azerbaijani also demonstrated a form of military “defiance.” At the proposal of Ilham Aliyev and by a decision of the Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan on March 4, 2008, a 34-member Azerbaijani unit withdrew from its peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, where it had been serving as part of the Turkish contingent, and returned to Baku.
Subsequently, in parallel with the deepening of relations with Serbia, Azerbaijan has not abandoned its opposition to the independence of Kosovo, nor its practice of linking this stance to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Moreover, due to shifting geopolitical circumstances, the withdrawal of the Azerbaijani peacekeeping contingent from Kosovo—deployed there since 1999—has been interpreted, and can still be retrospectively interpreted, as directly related to the negotiation process over Nagorno-Karabakh (the Prague Process). As is well known, at the time of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, a peacekeeping-based model for resolving the Karabakh conflict was also under consideration. In an effort to prevent a repetition of the Kosovo precedent, Baku, by recalling its contingent, effectively hindered a similar scenario unfolding in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani officials, in this context, characterized peacekeeping itself as a “mission supporting separatism.”
Despite the military and political support provided by Turkey to Kosovo, Azerbaijan blocked Kosovo’s membership in the World Customs Organization (WCO) in 2012 and 2017. During the 2017 conference of heads of customs administrations of the WCO European region held in Vienna, the Azerbaijani side reaffirmed that it does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and considers its unilateral declaration to be in violation of international law. According to the Azerbaijani official, Azerbaijan “has also faced issues of territorial integrity, and the discussion of political matters within the framework of a customs organization is unacceptable.”
Having grounded its position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan did not revise its approach even after the 2020 war against Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless, Kosovo hoped that, following the war and Azerbaijan’s apparent “release” from its Karabakh-related concerns, Baku would no longer be constrained in recognizing Kosovo’s independence. In August 2021, during a meeting of defense ministers held in Turkey, Pristina requested recognition from Azerbaijan (as well as from other countries). Meanwhile, Belgrade characterized this move as a violation of the Washington Agreement 2020—specifically the commitment not to seek recognition until September 1, 2021—and subsequently pointed to Azerbaijan’s policy as an exemplary model in the context of conflict resolution.
It is evident that discussions on Kosovo’s independence and requests for recognition during the meeting of defense ministers in Turkey reflect Kosovo’s attempt to secure recognition from Azerbaijan with Turkish support. Kosovo continues to view Turkey as an important partner and has not abandoned its expectations in this regard. However, even after establishing full control over Nagorno-Karabakh, and considering the conflict effectively resolved, Azerbaijan has maintained an unchanged position on Kosovo and continues to pursue a consistently firm policy. Moreover, Azerbaijan has deepened its relations with Serbia and provides significant diplomatic support to its efforts to restore territorial integrity. In this context, it becomes clear that Ankara does not possess sufficient leverage over Baku to align Azerbaijan’s position with Turkish interests, neither on the Kosovo issue nor on other foreign policy priorities.
“Geghard” scientific analytical foundation