On May 13, 2026, the National Investment Fund of Uzbekistan—UzNIF—completed one of the largest placements of state assets in the CIS on the London and Tashkent stock exchanges. The government offered 31% of the fund’s shares, raising more than $600 million. Based on the offer price, the fund’s total market value was estimated at approximately $1.95 billion. Buyers included major international institutional investors such as BlackRock (United States), Fidelity (United States), and Schroders (United Kingdom).
This transaction offers a useful point of comparison with Armenia’s National Interests Fund (ANIF). Both state institutions were established to attract investment and promote economic development, yet their mandates, governance systems, and oversight mechanisms differed substantially. Their outcomes were equally divergent: UzNIF entered the international capital market and generated significant proceeds for the state budget, whereas ANIF was liquidated after massive losses of public funds, with virtually no accountability for their waste.
Two Different Mandates
Established in 2019 as a state-owned company, ANIF was granted broad powers. It could attract investment, select and finance projects, establish joint ventures, and participate in business management across different sectors. The fund was also entrusted with managing the state’s shareholding in the Zangezur Copper and Molybdenum Combine.
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ANIF’s broad mandate was not matched by equally clear criteria for assessing its performance. It remained uncertain whether the fund’s success should be measured by the volume of investment attracted, the number of jobs created, the return on state capital, or the strategic importance of its projects. As a result, the fund was granted broad discretion over public resources without corresponding mechanisms of effective oversight and accountability. The International Monetary Fund noted that ANIF’s objectives were insufficiently defined and that its functions overlapped with those of other public institutions.
UzNIF is established and operates according to a different logic. It is assigned state shareholdings in major companies in the energy, transport, banking, telecommunications, and industrial sectors. Its mandate is not to create new enterprises, but to manage existing state assets, increase their value, and improve corporate governance. Its core asset portfolio is determined, while performance can be assessed through portfolio value, dividends, and the financial results of portfolio companies.
Governance and Oversight
Management of UzNIF was entrusted to the US investment group Franklin Templeton, which designs the fund’s strategy, corporate governance principles, and the governing bodies of portfolio companies. The state remains the owner of the assets, but the functions of owner and day-to-day manager are separated. ANIF had no such separation. The government simultaneously owned the fund, provided its capital, appointed its leadership, and participated through it in project selection and implementation. Goal-setting, investment selection, financing, and performance evaluation were concentrated within the same structure.
UzNIF also operates under a stringent external oversight regime. It publishes reports in accordance with international standards, undergoes external audits, and, following its stock-exchange listing, is required to disclose information to investors. Its activities are monitored not only by state bodies, but also by the exchange, auditors, shareholders, and regulators. These mechanisms do not eliminate political influence, but they constrain the scope for opaque and arbitrary decision-making.
ANIF: From Broad Powers to Liquidation
The Armenian government declared investment attraction and job creation to be ANIF’s primary objectives. However, the published information does not allow a reliable determination of what share of the announced funding was actually contributed by the fund’s private partners or how efficiently public funds were used.
The failure of key projects exposed not only the insufficient transparency of ANIF’s financial activities but also systemic problems in governance, oversight, accountability, and responsibility. The Ministry of Economy refused to approve ANIF’s 2022 financial statements, stating that they did not reliably reflect the financial position of the fund and its subsidiaries. Criminal proceedings were also initiated in relation to ANIF’s activities. In 2024, the Armenian government terminated the fund’s operations and liquidated it.
UzNIF: Privatization and Internationalization
The placement of 31% of UzNIF’s shares generated approximately $604 million for the state budget and established a market valuation for the fund. At the same time, the placement demonstrated that international investors were prepared to acquire, at the offer price, a stake in a consolidated portfolio of Uzbek state assets. The government succeeded in consolidating those assets into a structure intelligible to international markets, securing a public valuation, and selling part of the ownership to a broad range of investors.
Listing on the London Stock Exchange brought the fund within a system of international requirements for financial reporting, external audit, corporate governance, and disclosure. Franklin Templeton’s professional management, exchange oversight, and the predefined asset portfolio together created a more predictable and disciplined governance environment.
Why Were the Outcomes So Different?
ANIF operated according to a high-risk logic: public funds were directed toward financing newly established companies and projects in an environment of unclear investment-selection criteria and limited external oversight. UzNIF’s mandate, by contrast, is narrower and clearer: it manages existing state assets whose composition and financial performance are subject to public evaluation.
The difference between the two funds extended beyond investment strategy. It reflected two distinct approaches to public governance: in Armenia’s case, an excessive concentration of powers and reliance on self-oversight; in Uzbekistan’s case, separation of functions, external professional management, multilayered oversight, and market accountability. This institutional difference largely accounts for the diametrically opposite outcomes.
The experience of the two funds shows that the effectiveness of a state investment institution is determined not by the ambition of its declared objectives or claims that they are “unprecedented,” but by the quality of public governance, the clarity of its mandate, and genuine mechanisms of oversight and accountability.
UzNIF enabled Uzbekistan to present state assets to international investors and integrate them into global capital markets. ANIF, by contrast, ended for Armenia in the failure of a strategic state initiative and the dissipation and squandering of budgetary funds.
Armen MARTIROSYAN
Member of the Supreme Council and the National Assembly (1990-99)
Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary