As Armenia’s confrontation with Russia deepens, the country has found itself in a trade and economic conflict similar to those previously experienced by Georgia and Moldova. In both cases, Moscow’s restrictive measures were accompanied by efforts from Brussels to soften their impact by offering alternative trade and financial support instruments.
The forced diversification of Armenia’s foreign economic policy requires not a politically motivated assessment of the country’s “new course,” but an impartial analysis of its practical feasibility. In this regard, the examples of Georgia and Moldova are particularly instructive, since both countries’ economic relations with the European Union are based on Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, or DCFTAs.
The experience of these countries presents a mixed picture. Moldova has managed to reorient much of its foreign trade toward the European market: in 2024, the EU accounted for 67.3 percent of its exports, while the share of CIS countries fell to 6.8 percent. This trend continued in 2025, when exports to the EU reached $2.55 billion, or 67.5 percent of Moldova’s total exports. This became possible only after a long and capital-intensive process of regulatory adaptation, as well as the integration of Moldovan producers into European supply chains.
Georgia’s experience with reorienting exports toward the EU market has produced more restrained and somewhat troubling results. Despite the existence of a DCFTA and deeper institutional integration with Brussels, the European direction has not only failed to become a replacement for the Russian market but has also lagged significantly behind it in terms of momentum. While Georgian exports to Russia rose from approximately $441 million in 2020 to around $682 million in 2024, the EU share in Georgia’s total exports declined sharply, from 21.5 percent in 2020 to 8.7 percent in 2024. This contrast is especially pronounced in the agri-food sector: in 2024, Russia accounted for about 37 percent of Georgia’s agri-food exports, while the EU market accounted for only around 11 percent. Even taking into account the partial recovery of the EU share to 12.0 percent in 2025, the EU remained a much less significant export destination for Georgia than it had been at the beginning of the period under review, while the Russian market continued to retain stable importance.
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This means that even institutional integration with the EU, significantly deeper than Armenia’s current model of relations with Brussels, did not provide Georgia with a rapid and effective replacement of the Russian market with the European one.
Georgia’s experience should also be considered in light of another important factor: in addition to its DCFTA with the EU, Georgia has had a free trade agreement with China since 2018. Armenia has no comparable access regime to the Chinese market. Therefore, even with a broader network of trade agreements, the Russian market continues to play an important role for Georgia — a fact that complicates any rapid diversification of Armenian exports.
The logistical factor deserves special attention. Moldova has a land border with the EU through Romania, which significantly reduces the cost and delivery time of exports, especially for food and agricultural products, where speed of delivery, temperature control, and traceability of origin are critically important. A shared border with the EU facilitates not only physical access to the market, but also the gradual integration of producers into European supply chains.
In this sense, the Georgian experience is closer to Armenia’s own challenge. Despite its DCFTA, Georgia does not have a land border with the EU and remains heavily dependent on Black Sea routes, port infrastructure, and transit corridors. This makes exports to the EU more costly and less predictable, particularly for perishable goods. Consequently, the more visible growth in Moldova’s trade with the EU is explained not only by the depth of its institutional integration, but also by a geographic advantage that neither Georgia nor Armenia possesses.
A review of the key factors shaping the prospects for market diversification for Armenian producers, therefore, points to the need for a more restrained assessment of this process.
Easing access for certain categories of Armenian food and agricultural products to the EU market may have important political significance, but its stabilizing effect over the next two to three years should not be overestimated. The promised reduction of tariffs does not guarantee automatic access to the European market. Armenian producers will have to comply with the EU’s strict sanitary, phytosanitary, technical, and certification requirements, while also taking into account logistical constraints, especially in the case of perishable goods. In the long term, the European direction may become part of Armenia’s diversification strategy. In the short term, however, it is unlikely to replace the already established Russian market.
Under the current circumstances, the most effective short-term support instrument should not be limited to trade concessions. Direct financial assistance to affected exporters is also necessary. Such support should be provided in the form of grants rather than loans, since the issue is not the financing of long-term investment projects, but compensation for unforeseen losses caused by restricted access to a traditional market. The key question, therefore, is whether Armenia’s European partners, having outlined the prospect of a new market, are prepared to assume part of the short-term costs of the country’s foreign policy and geoeconomic reorientation.
At the same time, to help Armenian producers adapt to the EU’s strict regulatory, logistical, and quality requirements, the government of Armenia, together with its Western partners, should provide businesses with rapid technical assistance in certification, sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, logistics, packaging, and product traceability.
Yet the challenge facing Armenia is not limited to the prospects for exporting Armenian products to the EU market. The further deterioration of Armenian-Russian relations is a matter of concern. Both Yerevan and Moscow have effectively acknowledged that the previous formula of interaction requires rethinking. For now, this does not mean a revision of the formal allied framework, but rather a transformation of the nature of interaction within it. The surrender of Artsakh and the subsequent change in the regional balance of power have weakened the hierarchical structure of Armenian-Russian relations. Under these conditions, Armenia has rushed to use the expanded space for foreign policy maneuver, while Russia has been forced to adapt to the fact that its traditional mechanisms of influence no longer ensure the previous level of manageability in relations with Armenia.
It is telling that the Kremlin has not been in a hurry to congratulate Pashinyan. In these circumstances, official Yerevan’s response to Moscow’s “restraint” should be institutional rather than emotional. Moscow’s signal is a symptom of a deepening crisis of trust, but not a reason for further escalation. The allied framework remains in place, which means that all contentious issues — from trade restrictions to political distrust — can be discussed through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. The task is to prevent a further degradation of relations with Moscow while preserving a course of diversification that is calculated and free of bravado. As for trade disputes, they should be moved from the political and propaganda sphere into the technical one: Armenia should seek joint inspections, transparent phytosanitary procedures, agreed quality-control standards, and a mutually acceptable timetable for lifting restrictions.
It can be assumed that Armenian-Russian allied relations have reached a point where a new formula of interaction is needed — one based on managed pragmatism. The diversification of Armenia’s foreign policy ties and sources of support will be effective and sustainable only if it is not accompanied by unnecessary and often symbolic escalation in relations with Russia. Otherwise, the expansion of partnership with the EU risks becoming not an instrument for strengthening sovereignty, but a factor that weakens it — creating new vulnerabilities for the state and for the country’s entire socioeconomic system.
Armen MARTIROSYAN
Member of the Supreme Council and National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia (1990–1999),
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Armenia
Aravot daily
23.06.2026
