Discussion of Iran is often reduced to two options: continued engagement with the authorities or escalating pressure up to military confrontation. Yet the experience of recent decades suggests that neither approach, on its own, offers a durable answer. Periodic negotiations have at times reduced tension, but they have not altered the government’s fundamental conduct. Foreign war, meanwhile, cannot substitute for the political will and participation of the Iranian people.
A Crisis Beyond Foreign Policy
The roots of the crisis lie in a system that depends on concentrated power, restrictions on civil society, political repression, and the repeated use of external tension. From the ruling establishment’s perspective, meaningful retreat on the nuclear issue, regional policy, or domestic freedoms could intensify internal divisions. Its intransigence should therefore not always be interpreted as confidence; at times, it reflects fear of the consequences of genuine reform.
The article “Why Only the Third Option Can Save Iran and the Region” on the Iran Freedom website argues that reducing Iran’s future to a choice between war and accommodation overlooks the role of the Iranian people and domestic political forces.
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Why War Is Not the Answer
Foreign military intervention, even if it reduces the government’s military capacity, offers no guarantee of democracy. Iran is a large and diverse country with deep regional connections. A broad conflict could destroy infrastructure, displace civilians, prolong instability, and impose the heaviest burden on ordinary people. The authorities could also use an external threat to securitize society, restrict dissent, and rebuild cohesion among their forces.
The article “Why Did Mojtaba Khamenei Sound the War Trumpet Again?” on the Iran Freedom website also examines foreign escalation in relation to the authorities’ need to manage internal crises.
Human Rights at the Center
Iran’s foreign policy and its domestic human-rights record cannot be treated as separate subjects. The same structure that relies on pressure and crisis-making abroad also uses prisons, censorship, executions, and systematic deprivation at home. Reports from Qarchak Prison, for example, describe overcrowding, unsafe water, inadequate food, restricted medical care, and degrading treatment of women prisoners.
The report “Qarchak Prison: Women Prisoners Facing Hunger, Humiliation and Deprivation of Basic Rights” on the Bazdashtshodegan website provides a concrete example of these conditions.
These conditions are not merely a matter of poor prison administration. They show how judicial and security institutions are used for political control. Any international policy that separates human rights from nuclear and regional negotiations therefore addresses only part of Iran’s reality.
A Future Without Returning to the Past
Iran’s future should not be restricted to a choice between the current theocracy and the restoration of monarchy. A significant part of Iranian society, especially generations active in recent protests, does not see hereditary power as a solution. A future political order should emerge through a free popular vote, an elected constituent assembly, and open competition—not through family inheritance, foreign sponsorship, or agreements among outside powers.
Why Organization Matters
Public discontent in Iran is widespread, but discontent alone is not sufficient for a stable transition. Spontaneous protests without networks, a program, and continuity may be suppressed or lead to a political vacuum. In this context, Resistance Units linked to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) are part of Iran’s political reality. These networks seek to preserve communication, pass on experience, and sustain protest activity under intense security pressure.
Every political force should remain open to scrutiny and criticism. At the same time, the scale of the security and propaganda resources directed against the PMOI and Resistance Units linked to it indicates that the authorities fear independent organization more than scattered dissent.
A Framework for Transition
Maryam Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan proposes a framework based on a democratic republic, free elections, separation of religion and state, equal rights, the rule of law, and a peaceful, non-nuclear Iran. The value of such a program lies in the fact that it can be publicly examined and debated. The decisive principle should be that ultimate authority belongs to the people and their elected institutions.
The International Community’s Role
The international community should not choose a government for Iranians. A more constructive role would be to defend human rights, hold perpetrators accountable, support the free flow of information, and recognize the people’s right to organize and participate politically. Countries across the region would also benefit from a stable, non-nuclear Iran governed by the rule of law.
Conclusion
Iran is not trapped between war and accommodation. Engagement that disregards the rights of the people can give the government more time to repress; war can devastate society without delivering freedom. A durable path must grow from within society and rest on public participation, organized resistance, and a clear democratic transition program. Iran’s future should be decided through the ballot box, with no person or institution placed above the people’s vote in the name of religion, heredity, or military force.
Shahrokh Tavakoli