In the aftermath of the parliamentary elections, many have been trying to understand why the authorities continue to display such an aggressive attitude toward the opposition. After all, the official results have been announced, the ruling party’s “victory” has been officially declared, the Constitutional Court of Armenia has upheld the outcome, and the opposition has shown no inclination to escalate tensions in the post-election period. On the contrary, opposition forces have decided to take their seats in parliament and continue their political struggle within that framework.
One would expect the ruling authorities to have calmed down and begun enjoying its “victory.” Instead, it has continued to employ aggressive rhetoric and conduct that bears little resemblance to the behavior of a winner. Naturally, this has raised questions among the public.
The point, however, is that in the context of the parliamentary elections, the notions of “victory” and “defeat” represent only the visible tip of the iceberg. They are merely conventional assessments. Beneath the surface, the process has followed—and continues to follow—a very different logic, both externally and domestically, consisting of multiple layers that render both victory and defeat highly relative concepts.
Once the surface-level assessments are set aside, one may arrive at a fundamental conclusion—indeed, at a turning point: in Armenia, the levels of legitimacy enjoyed by the ruling camp and the opposition have, at the very least, become equal. If, after 2018, there was an exceptionally legitimate government and an opposition whose legitimacy was close to zero, the 2026 parliamentary elections have marked the elimination of that profound imbalance. The ruling party has lost its last remaining pillar of legitimacy—its electoral legitimacy—has collapsed, while the opposition has, at the same time, secured a relatively stable degree of political legitimacy.
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If it is too early to say that the balance has already shifted in the opposition’s favor, it is nevertheless possible to conclude that parity has been reached. Time, however, is working in the opposition’s favor. If opposition forces are able to continue engaging the public in a rational manner and capitalize on time working in their favor, the ruling force will face a major challenge and a strategic problem. This is precisely what, despite the appearance of “victory,” has instilled in the ruling force a profound sense of defeat and anxiety—manifested in the aggression that has followed.
Hakob BADALYAN
